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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee,
 C a s e N o 960502-CA 
V. 
GEORGE W. KREBS,
 P r i o r i t y N o 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Third District Court on June 21,1996, wherein 
the trial court denied Defendant's ("George") Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and sentenced 
him to 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
L Did George involuntarily and unknowingly enter his guilty plea based on the 
conduct of his trial counsel, Solomon Chacon, which was insufficient so as to deny George his 
Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel? Because this matter was remanded to the trial 
court for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 23B, this is a mixed question of law 
and fact. In Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 874 (Utah 1993), the supreme court stated that 
"deference is given to findings of fact, which will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, 
ultimate conclusions of law are to be reviewed for correctness." See also State v. Hay. 859 P.2d 
1,4-5 (Utah 1993) (holding that a claim of ineffectiveness presents mixed question of law and 
fact in which the appellate court will afford the trial court's conclusions no deference but 
findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous). 
2. Did the prosecutor breach the plea agreement when he promised to recommend 
to the court that George receive no prison time and then recommend to the Office of Adult 
Probation and Parole that George was a candidate for prison if he did not admit sexual intent? 
Breach of plea agreements are usually reviewed under principles of contract law and with the 
additional burden of constitutional protections being added and thus should be reviewed as issues 
of law and reviewed de novo or for correctness with no difference to the trial court's 
determinations. See United States v. Van Thournout. 100 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Proceedings, 
1. This case is before this Court as a result of the trial court's denial of George's 
Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea and the trial court's subsequent judgment sentencing George 
to prison forthwith for 0-5 years. R. at 85-106. 
2. George is challenging the trial court's decision to deny his Motion to Withdraw 
his Guilty Plea and the ensuing judgment. George bases his appeal claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel and breach of the plea agreement by the prosecutor. 
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B. The Course of the Proceedings in the Lower Court. 
1. In June, 1995, George was charged by Information with Aggravated Sexual Abuse 
of a Child, a First Degree Felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (1995). R. at 9-10. 
2. On February 16, 1996, the George entered a not guilty plea in his Arraignment 
before Judge J. Dennis Frederick. R. at 17-18. 
3. On March 29, 1996, Judge Frederick ordered the Trial continued to May 7, 1996. 
R. at 23. 
4. On May 6, 1996, George entered a change of plea to the Third Degree Felony of 
Attempted Sexual Abuse of a Child. R. at 24-33. 
5. On June 5, 1996, present counsel, Gregory G. Skordas, entered his Substitution 
of Counsel for Defendant. R. at 35-36. On that same day. Defendant filed a Motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea. R. at 37-38. 
6. On June 21,1996, Defendant argued his Motion to withdraw his guilty plea which 
the court denied and sentenced the George to serve a 0-5 year prison term at the Utah State 
Prison to be served forthwith. R. at 42-45. 
7. On July 3, 1996, Defendant filed a Motion for Amendment of the Judgment. R. 
at 47-48. The court denied Defendant's Motion for Modification of the Sentence by way of 
Minute Entry on September 5, 1996. R. at 66-67. 
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8. On July 19, 1996, Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal. R. at 59-60. 
9. On October 31,1996, Defendant filed a Motion and Memorandum with the Court 
of Appeals requesting an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 23B. 
10. On December 4,1996, Defendant and the State filed a Stipulation and Motion to 
Remand for a Rule 23B Evidentiary hearing. 
11. On January 2,1997, the Court of Appeals ordered the matter remanded to the trial 
court for an Evidentiary Hearing pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 23B concerning trial counsel's 
representations to Defendant regarding the plea agreement. R. at 107. 
12. On March 17,1997, the Third District Court held an Evidentiary Hearing to make 
findings of fact concerning the ineffective assistance of counsel. The Third District Court's 
findings were issued on April 30, 1997. R. at 113-22. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In June of 1995, George was charged by Information with Aggravated Sexual Abuse of 
a Child, a First Degree Felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (1995). 
Following an interview with the Murray Police, George, who had never been involved 
with the legal system in any way retained Solomon Chacon to represent him and "help him out 
of the mess he perceived himself to be in." R. at 149-50, 131. George had several interviews 
with his attorney wherein he repeatedly told Mr. Chacon that although he had touched the victim, 
he had no intent to sexually gratify himself. R. at 132-34, 152. 
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In January, 1996, George underwent a psychosexual treatment evaluation performed by 
Dr. Larry H. Fox at the request of Mr. Chacon. R. at 134. Throughout the evaluation process, 
George vehemently maintained his innocence of the crime charged. R. at 136. 
Dr. Fox's psychosexual evaluation report indicated that George would be at best, a very 
difficult candidate for sexual treatment even if he had committed a sex crime. R. at 138. Despite 
this knowledge, Mr. Chacon and the Assistant District Attorney, James M. Cope, entered into 
plea negotiations with the intent to obtain for George a sentence of probation and therapy. R. 
at 138, 173. Mr. Chacon assured George that if he pleaded guilty to a Third Degree Felony 
conviction for Attempted Sexual Abuse of a Child, that George would not have to declare that 
he had any intent to receive sexual gratification by the touching. R. at 139-40, 173-74. Mr. 
Chacon further guaranteed George that his sentence would include probation with out-patient 
counseling, thus avoiding a prison sentence. R. at 173. Relying upon Mr. Chacon's assurances 
and promptings, George entered a guilty plea on May 6, 1996. R. at 24-33, 173-74. 
In addition, the prosecutor promised, in the plea agreement, to recommend probation for 
George rather than prison. R. at 26-33. Despite this promise to George on June 7, 1996, the 
prosecutor informed the Office of Adult Probation and Parole that George should not be given 
probation if he did not admit to sexual intent. See Presentence Investigative Report at p. 13, 
attached hereto as Addendum "D". 
On May 6,1996, George signed the plea agreement and the trial court accepted George's 
change of plea. R. at 73-84. After his interview with Karen Shepherd of the Office of Adult 
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Probation and Parole, George realized that to obtain a recommendation for probation and 
therapy, he was required to declare himself a sexual predator to Ms. Shepherd despite the 
assurances that he would no have to admit sexual problems. He then hired new counsel with the 
intent to withdraw his guilty plea because he adamantly denied that any touching occurred with 
sexual intent. R. at 174. 
George filed a Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea. R. at 37-38. On June 21, 1997, the 
trial court heard arguments on the Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea, denied the Motion and 
sentenced George to prison for 0-5 years to be served forthwith. R. at 85-106. It was from this 
action that George appealed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
George received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel continued to pursue plea 
negotiations and continued to induce George to plead guilty to a sexual crime when George had 
repeatedly asserted that he had not acted with any sexual intent. Counsel knew such 
nonadmissions of sexual intent would make it virtually impossible for George to receive 
probation and therapy given the practice and policy at the Office of Adult Probation and Parole 
to recommend probation only when a defendant readily admits that he or she has a sexual 
problem. 
Counsel's ineffective assistance in inducing George to continue to proceed with the plea 
agreement prejudiced George in that were he aware that he had admit to sexual intent he would 
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not have changed his plea to guilty and would have instead pursued trial. In addition, the 
prosecutor breached the plea agreement by acting in bad faith when he agreed to recommend 
probation for George at the Sentencing and then in turn recommended prison time to the Office 
of Adult Probation and Parole which effectively undermined George's expectation in the plea 
agreement for which this Court should remand and allow George to withdraw his guilty plea. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Defendant's Trial Counsel Was Ineffective When He Pursued Plea 
Negotiations with the Offer of Probation Despite Knowledge That 
Defendant Would Not Receive Recommendation for Parole from 
Adult Parole and Probation. 
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims involve a two-part analysis. First, defendant must 
show that his counsel rendered deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and that 
such performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment. State 
v. Arguelles. 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996). Second, defendant must show that counsel's 
ineffective performance prejudiced defendant. IcL Courts allow a broad presumption in favor 
of counsel's actions that "might be considered sound trial strategy." State v. Huggins. 920 P.2d 
1195, 1198 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. 
Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984)). 
A. Reasonable Professional Judgment Militated Against Counsel's 
Inducement to Get Defendant to Plead Guilty, 
George's counsel provided deficient assistance when he induced George to plead guilty 
to attempted sexual abuse of a child. Counsel proceeded with a plea negotiation in which 
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George expected that he would plead guilty to the crime without admitting to any sexual intent. 
R. at 119,173-74. In return, George would receive recommendations from the prosecutor that 
he serve no prison time. R. at 119-20. However, after submitting to a Psychosexual Evaluation 
in which George was adjudged as a poor candidate for sexual therapy, George was extremely 
unlikely to receive probation because he could not admit to sexual intent. This is important 
because in the criminal law community, it is common knowledge that judges rely heavily on the 
Office of Adult Probation and Parole's Presentence Investigation Reports in determining 
sentences. Moreover, it is common knowledge among the legal community that if a person is 
charged with a sexual offense and refuses to admit that he or she has a sexual problem then the 
Office of Adult Probation and Parole will not recommend parole in lieu of prison. R. at 121. 
In the Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing, the witnesses testified that it was common 
knowledge that without an admission of sexual intent to the Office of Adult Probation and 
Parole, sex offense defendants would not receive a recommendation for incarceration. This is 
exemplified in Defendant's present counsel's examination of Mr. Chacon. 
Q: Speaking specifically about George's interview with Ms. 
Shepherd, did you give him instruction that in May - whenever 
this statement was signed — and the time that he - I guess it was 
May the 6th, and the time that the sentencing was to be held? 
A: Yes, I did. I told him to go and interview with Ms. Shepherd, 
and told him, you know, that there might be a difficulty with 
Kathy, because I had seen her work in other cases that caused me 
some concern. 
Q: What caused you concern with her work in previous cases? 
S 
A: Well, it was my understanding in talking to former clients and 
other attorneys that she usually required the individual to 
immediately walk in and basically say, "I'm a sexual predator," or 
"I'm a sexual person, I need some help, I'm willing to get it in 
order to get probation." 
Q: That's a fairly well-known fact in the legal community? 
A: Right, it is. and therefore I knew that that was going to be a 
little bit cautionary, because I knew George had this attitude about 
whether his role was or was not sexual. 
R. at 148. 
In addition, Kathy Shepherd of the Office of Adult Probation and Parole when examined, 
testified that it was 
certainly a philosophy among not only our staff in dealing with 
sexual offenders but certainly the general treatment community 
that when someone enters a plea of guilty to a crime involving that 
type of conduct, if there is not an admission of a related problem, 
that certainly treatment is of no benefit. 
R. at 164. 
Ms. Shepherd's examination continued and she elaborated that if sex crime defendants 
did not immediately admit sexual problems to the Office of Adult Probation and Parole that they 
would not be recommended for parole and treatment as follows: 
Q: That's well-known in the community, to your knowledge? 
A: Certainly, yes. 
Q: Because that's, in your opinion, the policy and policy of others, 
and has been for years, correct? 
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A: Correct 
Q: You would expect any attorney who has been practicing in this 
state of Utah to realize that, wouldn't you? 
A: Its true that we have to have an acknowledgment up front, 
because we can't give months and years for them under the 
circumstances to make that acknowledgment. 
R. at 164, 169. 
This was such an ingrained policy at the Office of Adult Probation and Parole that after 
Ms. Shepherd's interview with George, she recommended immediate imprisonment based on 
George's nonadmission of a sexual problem. R. at 168-69. Despite the fact that the Office of 
Adult Probation and Parole's own Presentence Investigation Report on the General Disposition 
Matrix indicated that George was not a candidate for prison. See Presentence Investigation 
Report at p. 20, attached hereto as Addendum "D". 
Finally, Mr. Chacon was also aware that with regards to sexual offenses, Judge Frederick 
did not generally have a predisposition to allow defendants parole without admitting sexual 
intent. R. at 156. This clearly indicates that Mr. Chacon was fully cognizant of the prevailing 
standard in dealing with sexual offenses by the Office of Adult Probation and Parole. R. at 119, 
121. 
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B. Defendant's Counsel Rendered Deficient Assistance. 
Despite the fact that George presented a poor candidate for therapy as provided in Dr. 
Fox's Psychosexual Evaluation, Mr. Chacon pursued plea negotiations with Assistant District 
Attorney James M. Cope to secure a sentence of parole and therapy for George. R. at 138. 
Again, despite his realization that George would most likely not receive a parole 
recommendation from the Office of Adult Probation and Parole if George continued to deny 
sexual intent, Mr. Chacon pressed George to carry through with the plea. R. at 136, 154-55. 
It is unreasonable for an attorney to plead a defendant to a sex crime without the 
admission of sexual problem and not expect that defendant would go to prison. In the instant 
case, George continuously and strongly denied any sexual intent on his part. During the plea 
negotiations between the District Attorney's Office and trial counsel, both sides were fully aware 
of George's absolute insistence that he did not act with any sexual intent and took it into 
consideration as part of their negotiation efforts. R. at 134-36; see also James M. Cope letter 
attached hereto as Addendum "C". Notwithstanding that, George's attorney pleaded him guilty 
under circumstances in which counseling and probation were a virtual impossibility in light of 
the legal community standard. 
George's counsel did not properly prepare him for the interview with the Office of Adult 
Probation and Parole in preparation of their Presentence Investigation Report. Indeed everybody 
was on the same page that it was necessary for George to admit a sexual problem entering the 
presentence interview with the Office of Adult Probation and Parole, except George. 
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As required by the plea agreement, George entered the interview with Ms. Shepherd of 
the Office of Adult Probation and Parole intent on fully cooperating. To cooperate, George 
voluntarily signed a waiver releasing to Ms. Shepherd Dr. Fox's psychosexual evaluation 
conducted by Dr. Fox (that George had never seen) and George expressed willingness to 
undergo counseling if the Office of Adult Probation and Parole or trial court felt that it was 
required. See pp. 6, 11 of the Presentence Investigation Report hereto attached as Addendum 
"D". 
However, Mr. Chacon had not informed George that he was expected to "cooperate" with 
the Office of Adult Probation and Parole by admitting immediately that he was a sexual predator. 
In other words, George felt that he had pleaded guilty to an improper albeit nonsexual touching 
causing emotional or physical pain to a child, as he had continuously maintained throughout the 
process.1 Nobody informed him that regardless of the elements to which he felt he pleaded 
guilty, it was essential that George admit that he had a sexual problem before he could receive 
the possibility of the all important recommendation from the Office of Adult Probation and 
Parole for a sentence without prison. 
1
 In the Rule 23B Hearing, George was examined concerning his understanding to what 
he was pleading: 
I was told that all I had to plead to was causing some discomfort 
and pain, and that in so doing, I would be granted probation. I did 
not have to, at any point, admit to any sexual touching of any kind. 
R. at 174 (emphasis added). 
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C. Counsel's Ineffective Assistance to Defendant but for Counsel's 
Inducements Defendant Would Not Have Plead Guilty. 
Despite the fact that everybody but George was aware that if he did not admit to sexual 
intent, then he would not receive a recommendation for probation and therapy from the Office 
of Adult Probation and Parole, defense counsel continued to assure George that if he would enter 
into the plea agreement that he would receive probation and would not do any prison time. R. 
at 174. Apparently, Mr. Chacon had had some success in a previous case in which a client had 
plead guilty without admitting sexual intent. R. at 154. However, he conceded that Ms. 
Shepherd would not make a recommendation for probation and therapy without George readily 
admitting that he had a sexual problem.2 R. at 154-55. In addition, Mr. Chacon was aware that 
Judge Frederick "was particularly tough on this type of offense." R. at 156. Regardless of Mr. 
2
 Mr. Chacon testified at the Rule 23B hearing concerning that the Office of Adult 
Probation and Parole's general policy: 
I believe that when the interview -- if they [sex crime defendants] 
didn't, in the interview, readily admit that they had a sexual 
problem, that probation would be -- wouldn't be an option, 
because, you know, she would make the determination that if you 
didn't admit to a problem, it couldn't be helped. That's the 
problem I had, because the report from Dr. Fox said that George's 
particular psychological condition was one that counseling itself 
would have to direct him to a point where he would admit his 
sexuality, and that based on the limited interview with Ms. 
Shepherd, I didn't see how this type of an individual would be able 
to make that admission to her in such a fashion, you know, to be 
able to affirmatively gain a recommendation from AP&P, from 
Judge Frederick for probation. 
R. at 154-55. 
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Chacon's assertions however, George clearly would not have plead guilty to a crime in which 
he would have to admit sexual intent. R. at 144. George was convinced by Mr. Chacon that he 
was pleading guilty only to the provision in the statute dealing with a touching that would cause 
discomfort or physical pain but was not sexual in any way. R. at 173-74. 
Thus, it was clearly unreasonable for Mr. Chacon to plead George him guilty to a sex 
offense or sex crime without admission of sexual responsibility in the face of the well known 
standard that it is essential that a defendant assert sexual responsibility in order for the Office 
of Adult Probation and Parole to recommend probation and therapy to the trial court. It was 
almost inevitable that such ineffective assistance of counsel would assuredly result in George 
sentenced to prison rather than sentenced to probation with therapy. 
II. The Prosecutor Breached the Plea Agreement by Promising 
Defendant That He Would Recommend Probation to the Court and 
Then Advising Adult Probation and Parole That Defendant Was Not 
a Candidate for Parole. 
The prosecutor acted in bad faith in executing his portion of the plea agreement because 
he greed to recommend probation at the Sentencing Hearing while informing Adult Probation 
and Parole that George should go to prison. "[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on 
a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or 
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." Santobello v. New York. 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 
S. Crt. 495, 499 (1971). Moreover, prosecutors, in order to comply with the plea agreement, 
cannot rely upon "rigidly literal construction of the language" of the agreement, nor may 
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prosecutors accomplish through indirect means what they promised not to do directly. United 
States v. Hawlev. 93 F.3d 682, 692 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hand. 913 F.2d 854, 856 
(10th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). Plea agreements are generally governed by contract 
principles and are construed according to what the defendant reasonably understood when he 
entered his plea. Hawley. 93 F.3d at 692; States v. Mares. 888 P.2d 930, 933 (N.M. 1994) 
(holding plea agreement is unique form of contract and court will construe terms according to 
what defendant reasonably understood). In Hawley. the defendant entered a plea agreement in 
which the government would not oppose certain sentencing adjustments favorable to the 
defendant and would file a motion for a downward adjustment for substantial assistance "if 
appropriate". Hawley at 684. At the Sentencing Hearing the prosecution made a lengthy 
declaration concerning previously unknown facts that appeared in the Presentence Investigation 
Report that were unknown to the prosecution at the time they entered into the plea agreement. 
Those facts recited in the Presentence Investigation Report were unfavorable to the defendant 
and the court determined that by highlighting those negative facts, "[taken] as a whole, the 
prosecutor's comments here appear to be a thinly disguised, if disguised at all ever to persuade 
court in a way that the government had promised it would not do." Hawley, 93 F.3d at 693. 
Similarly, in the present case's plea agreement, the State represented by James M. Cope, 
agreed to "recommend probation, without jail time, if George W. Krebs fully cooperates with 
counseling and probation personnel during preparation of PSR and while on probation." R. at 
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126-33. At the Sentencing Hearing, the prosecutor did state tentatively that "it might be 
appropriate in this case, therefore, that George receive probation in spite of the recommendation 
of Adult Probation and Parole." R. at 102. Nevertheless, the prosecutor predicated this 
statement with the following: 
I believe that an appropriate sentence in this regard would make 
sure that he does not have contact, especially inappropriate contact, 
with children. I believe that an appropriate sentence would put 
upon him the burden of getting himself fixed. I'm not certain even 
to this point and time that he realizes there's something wrong with 
touching the genitals or the anus of a young person, even under the 
guise of putting medication on them. One might choose to believe 
that if the child were three years old, but not if the child were 10 
or 11 or 12, as in this case. 
R. at 101. 
Such comments seem to indicate the prosecutor's efforts to "persuade the court in a way that the 
government had promised it would not do. Hawley. 93 F.3d at 693. 
Moreover during the plea negotiations the same prosecutor stated that "since he 
[Defendant] has already admitted to the physical acts satisfying the touching element of the 
statute, he may be able to gain a probationary sentence even if he denies doing it for sexual 
gratification." See James M. Cope letter attached hereto as Addendum "C". It is absolute irony 
that Mr. Cope timidly recommended probation "in spite of the Office of Adult Probation and 
Parole" at the sentencing hearing when only a few days before the sentencing hearing, Mr. Cope 
indicated to the Office of Adult Probation and Parole that "in his view, if the Defendant 
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continues to maintain he has no sexual problems, and did not touch and digitally penetrate the 
victim for sexual reasons, then he is not immunable to treatment, and should not be considered 
for the privilege of probation." Presentence Investigation Report p. 15 attached hereto as 
Addendum "D". 
Thus, although the prosecutor did in fact meekly recommend probation for George at the 
Sentencing Hearing, he breached the plea agreement and poisoned the process by recommending 
to the Office of Adult Probation and Parole that George should not be eligible for probation. 
This breached the spirit if not the intent of the agreement contemplated by the parties in the plea 
agreement. As a result, this Court should remand to the trial court because the prosecutor had 
breached the plea agreement and therefore the plea agreement was no longer enforceable, and 
George should be allowed to withdraw the guilty plea. See United States v. Van Thournout. 100 
F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 1996) (allowing two potential remedies for governments breach of plea 
agreement: remand for specific performance and withdrawal of the guilty plea). 
CONCLUSION 
George's counsel provided ineffective assistance when he induced George to plead guilty 
to attempted sexual abuse of a child with the knowledge that by so pleading without admission 
of sexual intent, that it would be nearly impossible for George to receive sentence without prison 
time. Moreover, the prosecutor breached the plea agreement pursued a course of action which 
it promised George that it would not do by recommending to the Office of Adult Probation and 
Parole that if George did not admit to a sexual intent that he should not be considered a candidate 
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for probation. For these reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court's decision to accept 
George's guilty plea and allow George to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Defendant/Appellant respectfully requests oral argument. 
DATED this / 1 day of June, 1997, 
WATKISS DUNNING & WATKISS, P.C. 
,S ,k \ « _ 
Gregory G. St/ordas 
Lloyd R. J<rties 
Attorneys forDefendant/Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
GEORGE W. KREBS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT FROM 
RULE 23B HEARING 
Case No. 96190136 FS 
Appellate Case No. 960502-CA 
Originally charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first-degree felony 
with a potential minimum mandatory sentence of 3, 6, or 9 years, defendant eventually 
pled guilty to attempted sexual abuse of a child, a third-degree felony. The trial court 
accepted the recommendation of Adult Probation & Parole and sentenced defendant to 
an indeterminate term of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison. Defendant 
appealed, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel, among other things. During 
his appeal, he asked the Utah Court of Appeals to remand his case under rule 23B, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to ferret out additional facts and determine whether 
G* 
tz&Dtsma COURT 
Third Juc&ial DisSJt 
' Wt 3 0 1997 
his counsel gave constitutionally deficient advice when he recommended defendant 
accept a plea. Specifically, defendant states that his trial counsel did not tell him that in 
order to qualify for probation, he would have to admit a wrongful sexual intent. 
Because defendant did not admit a wrongful sexual intent, AP&P recommended prison. 
The trial court accepted that recommendation. Defendant now alleges that if his trial 
counsel had informed him that he could not have received probation absent admitting a 
wrongful sexual intent, he would have refused the plea and gone to trial. 
Before the appeal, the trial court entertained defendant's motion to withdraw his 
plea. Though the trial court did not then look into the alleged ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the court denied the motion after reviewing the plea colloquy and affidavit. It 
found that defendant made his plea knowingly and voluntarily with a full understanding 
of the consequences. 
Upon receiving the remand order from the appellate court, this court scheduled 
an evidentiary hearing for March 17, 1997. Gregory Skordas represented defendant; 
James H. Beadles, assistant attorney general, represented the State. Defendant and 
Solomon Chacon, trial counsel for defendant, testified. The defendant also called 
Kathy Shepherd, an employee of Adult Probation & Parole, who completed defendant's 
Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSI). The court now issues factual findings. 
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1. Defendant admitted touching the victim at least 50 times on and around 
the vagina and anus from the time the victim was six years old until she was twelve. 
There was often digital penetration as well. 
2. This touching typically occurred while both the victim and defendant were 
underneath a blanket. 
3. Defendant claimed he did this in order to administer medication. 
4. Solomon Chacon was defendant's trial counsel. He is an experienced 
criminal defense attorney with approximately 20 years of experience in both criminal 
prosecution and defense. 
5. After talking with his client, discovering that he refused to admit a 
wrongful sexual intent, and looking at the facts of the crime, Mr. Chacon referred 
defendant to a therapist, Dr. Larry Fox, for a psychosexual evaluation and to determine 
amenability to treatment. 
6. Because defendant denied a wrongful sexual intent, Mr. Chacon knew that 
neither AP&P nor the court would readily consider probation. 
7. Therefore, Mr. Chacon explained all the elements of the crime and 
explained to him that he could plead guilty to the crime while admitting to a wrongful 
intent regarding the infliction of serious emotional or bodily pain. Thus, he would not 
need to admit a wrongful sexual intent and he would still qualify for a plea agreement 
3 
in which the State recommended probation and would not object to post-probation 
reduction of sentence to a class A misdemeanor. 
8- Defendant agreed to this plan, understanding that he would also need to 
cooperate with AP&P during the PSI interview. 
9. Through his evaluation of all the evidence, and his experience in criminal 
practice, Mr. Chacon believed defendant would be convicted of the offense charged, 
i.e., a first-degree felony. Mr. Chacon believed the best way to keep defendant out of 
prison would be through a plea agreement that would also allow defendant to gain 
therapy. 
10. Mr. Chacon worked out a plea agreement with the prosecutor, James 
Cope, that reduced the first-degree felony charge to a third-degree felony. The 
agreement also included a State recommendation of probation with no jail time, and, 
upon motion, reducing the conviction to a class A misdemeanor after probation, with 
no objection from the State. The State also agreed not to charge defendant with any 
other offenses of which it was aware. 
11. Both Mr. Chacon and the court informed defendant that the 
recommendations were not binding on either the court or AP&P. 
12. At the change of plea hearing, the defendant admitted guilt along with the 
requisite facts and elements. Defendant did not admit a sexual intent. He also 
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acknowledged that the court could send him to prison despite the probation recommendation. 
13. At the interview with Ms. Shepherd, defendant denied any wrongful 
sexual intent. 
14. Ms. Shepherd, in accordance with the unwritten policy of the agency, of 
which Mr. Chacon was aware, recommended prison due to defendant's refusal to admit 
a wrongful intent. Ms. Shepherd testified that AP&P believes that a defendant who 
refuses to admit is a poor candidate for treatment and probation. 
15. The trial court did not believe defendant's proffered medication excuse. 
Consequently, because of defendant's refusal to admit a wrongful sexual intent, along 
with the multiple occurrences and the effect of defendant's crimes on the victim, it 
refused to accept the terms of the plea agreement and imposed the statutory prison 
sentence. 
DATED THIS jfL day of April 1997. 
Stipulation 
GREGORY ^SKORDAS 
LLOYD R. JONES 
Counsel for Defendant 
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41 OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 76-5-404.1 
76-5-404. Forcible sexual abuse. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v. Fife, 283 Utah A<*v. Kep. 30 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
76-5-404.1. Sexual abuse of child — Aggravated sexual 
abuse of child. 
(1) A person commits sexual abuse of a child if, under circumstances not 
amounting to rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or an 
attempt to commit any of these offenses, the actor touches the anus, buttocks, 
or genitalia of any child, the breast of a female child younger than 14 years of 
age, or otherwise takes indecent liberties with a child, or causes a child to take 
indecent liberties with the actor or another with intent to cause substantial 
emotional or bodily pain to any person or with the intent to arouse or gratify 
the sexual desire of any person regardless of the sex of any participant. 
(2) Sexual abuse of a child is punishable as a second degree felony. 
(3) A person commits aggravated sexual abuse of a child when in conjunc-
tion with the offense described in Subsection (1) any of the following circum-
stances have been charged and admitted or found true in the action for the 
offense: 
(a) The offense was committed by the use of a dangerous weapon as 
defined in Section 76-1-601, or by force, duress, violence, intimidation, 
coercion, menace, or threat of harm, or was committed during the course 
of a kidnaping. 
(b) The accused caused bodily injury or severe psychological injury to 
the victim during or as a result of the offense. 
(c) The accused was a stranger to the victim or made friends with the 
victim for the purpose of committing the offense. 
(d) The accused used, showed, or displayed pornography or caused the 
victim to be photographed in a lewd condition during the course of the 
offense. 
(e) The accused, prior to sentencing for this offense, was previously 
convicted of any felony, or of a misdemeanor involving a sexual offense. 
(f) The accused committed the same or similar sexual act upon two or 
more victims at the same time or during the same course of conduct. 
(g) The accused comnutted, in Utah or elsewhere, more than five 
separate acts, which if committed in Utah would constitute an offense 
described in this chapter, and were committed at the same time, or during 
the same course ofeonduxrt, or before or after the instant offense. 
(h) The offense was coinmitted by a person who occupied a position of 
special trust in relation to the victim; "position of special trust'' means that 
position occupied by a pex-son in a position of authority, who, by reason of 
that position is able to exercise undue influence over the victim, and 
includes, but is not limited to, the position occupied by a youth leader or 
recreational leader who i& an adult, adult athletic manager, adult coach, 
teacher, counselor, religious leader, doctor, employer, foster parent, baby-
sitter, or adult scout leader, though a natural parent, stepparent, adoptive 
parent, or other legal guardian, not including a foster parent, who has 
been living in the household, is not a person occupying a position of special 




FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
E.NEALGUNNARSON 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
VALTER R. ELLETT, CHIEF DEPUTY 
April 29,1996 
Mr. Solomon Chacon 
945 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re:. State of Utah vs. George W. Krebs 
Dear Solomon: 
Thank you for speaking with me last week about possible settlement of this matter prior 
to trial. You relate that your client is willing to plead guilty to five separate counts of Lewdness 
Involving a Child, Class A Misdemeanors. Further, he is willing to waive the Statute of 
Limitations to be able to enter such pleas. 
I discussed this offer with the victim's parents on Friday, 24 April. They, in turn, 
discussed the matter with Melissa. They feel your offer is a good start, but that it does not go far 
enough. I agree. Mr. Krebs may plead to a single Third Degree Felony, Attempted Sexual 
Abuse of a Child. Since he has already admitted to the physical acts satisfying the touching 
element of the statute, he may be able to gain a probationary sentence even if he denies doing it 
for sexual gratification. This would certainly seem a prudent thing in view of the new 
accusations and Krebsr inability to obtain a positive polygraph score. 
Please let me know what you would like to do by Friday. I think that I can convict Mr. 
Krebs of a first degree felony, but I don't yet believe that he needs to go to prison, necessarily. I 
hope that he takes the State's offer so that both he and the victim do not have to air all this family 
business in front of a jury. 
Sincerely, 
JAMES M. COPE 
Deputy District Attorney 
D  V 
•^DEFENDANT'S 
f f & EXHIBIT 
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Date Due: 06-11-96 
Sentencing Date: 06-l-L-96 
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
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(CITY) (COUNTY) 
KATHERINE C. SHEPHERD INVESTIGATOR 
NAiME: KREBS. GEORGE W. COURT CASE NO: 961900136 
ALIASES: NONE OBSCIS NO: 00088629 
ADDRESS: 4634 BOX ELDER STREET CO-DEFENDANTS: NONE 
MURRAY, UTAH 84107 OFFENSE: ATTEMPTED SEXUAL ABUSE OF A 
BIRTH DATE: 12-24-61 AGE: 3* CHILD, THIRD DEGREE FELONY. ONE COUNT 
BIRTHPLACE: UTAH PLEA: GUILTY DATE: 05-06-96 
LEGAL RESIDENCE: UTAH PROS- ATTORNEY: JAMES COPE 
MARITAL STATUS: SINGLE DEF. ATTORNEY: SOLOMON CHACON 
PAGE 2 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
KREBS, GEORGE W. 
PLEA BARGAIN: 
The defendant was originally charged with one count of Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child, a 
First Degree Felony carrying a mandatory minimum imprisonment term. Through plea 
negotiations, he was allowed to enter a plea of guilty to the reduced charge of Attempted Sexual 
Abuse of a Child, a Third Degree Felony. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Records of die Salt Lake District Attorney's Office. 
OFFENSE 
OFFTCTAL VERSION OF OFFENSE: 
On 05-22-95 the Munay City Police Department was contacted by Ms. Cindy Krebs, regarding 
the possible sexual abuse of her daughter, Melissa Krebs? DOB 12-19-82 (age eleven). Tne 
suspect was identified as George Krehs^ Melissa's paternal uncle. 
On 05-23-95 Detective Alex HuggarcL and Ms. Shanna Dorius? Division of Family Services, 
interviewed Melissa at the Children's Justice Center. Melissa stated she had been couched on her 
'"private area" and buttocks by her Uncle George Krebs at her grandmother's home in Murray. 
Utah, on numerous occasions. 
Melissa stated the earliest incident of abuse she could recall took place when she was five or six 
years old, when the suspect began touching her on her "'private area" under her pants. She stated 
she initially told her mother who, at the time Melissa disclosed, was on the phone speaking with 
her grandmother, and Melissa stated no one beiieved herr thinking she was either confused or 
was "kidding." Melissa stated because she was not beiieved the first time she did not report it 
again, and the touching became more frequent. Melissa stated almost every time she went to her 
grandmother's home and stayed overnight the suspect would touch her on her private area and 
her buttocks. She stated she beiieved there were "at least fifty" occurrences of the touching. 
Melissa indicated the most recent incident of abuse she could recall happened just after Easter in 
April of 1995. She stated on that occasion she was at her grandparent's home, and the suspect 
stuck his finger inside of her pants and rubbed her on the front of her vaainai area 
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
KREBS, GEORGE W. 
OFFICIAL VERSION: (continued) 
Melissa stated she was unsure if the suspect had ever digitally penetrated her vagina, but reported 
he had placed his finger ''inside of my butt" She indicated this was painful, and advised shQ had 
cold die suspect that it hurt. 
Melissa indicated die abuse would usually occur in her grandmother's bedroom, stating there was 
a TV in there and she would go in and iie on die bed to watch TV. She stated her Uncle George 
would come in, put a blanket over her, and dien begin to fondle her in the vaginal area and on the 
buttocks. She stated sometimes this would occur for as long as five minutes. She aiso stated 
when die suspect would get up early to go to work, she would be sleeping in the living room of 
the residence and he would come in and touch her on the buttocks and vaginai area underneath 
her pajamas, believing she was asleep. 
Melissa stated, with the exception of die digital penetration to her buttocks, the suspect had not 
penetrated her with his penis, nor had he exposed himself to her. She stated no intercourse had 
been attempted. 
Detective Huggard asked Melissa why she had decided to teil about the abuse again, and she 
stated during a family dinner, the suspect came in and began to put his hands around her hips 
toward her vaginal area. She stated she tried to get away from him and he followed her and 
succeeded in touching her. Melissa stated she was extremely tired of the abuse and did not want 
to be subjected to it any longer, so she told her mother again and this time, her mother contacted 
the family's LDS stake president, who referred them to LDS Social Services, and LDS Social 
Services instructed them to contact the Division of Family Services and make a report. 
Detective Huggard aiso interviewed Melissa's parents, Cindy and John Krebs, and -vis. Krebs 
was asked if she remembered Melissa telling her the suspect was touching her when she was five 
or six years old. Ms. Krebs stated she did recall this, indicating she now felt extremely guilty, 
because at die time, she diought Melissa was confused. She stated she even asked her mother-in-
law (suspect's mother) about it and the mother-in-law told her she was sure such touching was 
not occurring. Mr. and Mrs. Krebs stated they were fully supportive of Melissa, and were also 
supportive of prosecution, if necessary to resolve the problem. 
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
KR£BS? GEORGE W. 
OFFICIAL VERSION: (continued) 
On 05-25-95 Detective Huggard interviewed the suspect at the Murray City Police Department. 
Mr. Krebs was advised of his rights as per Miranda which he stated he understood and waived. 
Regarding die allegations of sexual abuse made by Melissa, Mr. Krebs described his brother and 
sister-in-law "pushing Melissa off on me,n stating he had taken care of her since she was a baby 
and ail of the touching he had engaged in was applying ointment to her bottom ~when sh^ had 
diaper rash." Ke indicated this had continued umil Melissa was at least twelve years old. stating 
he would open up her vagina and check inside for any type of redness, and on more than one 
occasion did insert his finger inside of her vagina up to the first joint in an effort to "check her/7 
and also inserted his finger into her anal area in an effort to "apply'medication.* 
The suspect stated Melissa would use a blanket to get under when he would be applying the 
medication in his mother's bedroom, and stated the touching during the morning hours described 
by Melissa was him getting up and coming in to check her after applying the ointment the 
previous night, to see if she needed another application of ointment before he went to work: 
however, the suspect adamandy denied the touching was for any sexual reason and stated he had 
never become sexually aroused. He indicated he had only engaged in the touching for '•medical 
reasons." 
Detective Huggard confronted the suspect about the unlikelihood ofhim placing medication on a 
twelve year old giri, and his touching of Melissa being for "medical reasons.'' rather than being 
sexually motivated. The suspect did acknowledge the touching in April of 1995, but again 
insisted it was for "medical reasons" and with the knowledge of the family. 
Detective Huggard again spoke with Melissa's parents and asked if at any time they had 
requested the suspect place medication on Melissa. They denied having ever requested he do so, 
nor were they aware of any medical problems. 
This case was screened with the Salt Laice District Attorney's OflSce and an Information 
charging the defendant with one count of Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child, a First Degree 
Felony carrying- a mandatory minimum imprisonment term was filed, because of the number of 
abuse episodes which transpired and because on occasion, the suspect h*d been in a position of a 
caretaker to the victim. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Murray City Police Department records; records of the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office. 
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
KRE3S, GEORGE W. 
DEFENDANTS VERSTON OF OFFENSE: 
;iI applied Desirine to my niece's sore bottom as directed by both her parents and Grandma (my 
mother). I did this because of my mother's medicai problems, which make it hard for her to get 
up and get around. Although I didn't do this every time she came over I did do it a number of 
times. I didn't do it for any sexuai gradifacation or arousal, but I seem to have caused her some 
physical pain. I never meant or intended :o do this. I am sorry this happened and if I couid cum 
back the clock I wouldn't touch her at ail."' 
Is/ George Krebs Date: 5-21-96 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Handwritten statement submitted by die defendant. 
COMMENTS: 
During the presentence interview, the suspect denied any sexuai abuse of the victim, stating the 
oniy time he touched Melissa was to put medication on her vaginal and buttock area at the 
request of Melissa's parents. When confronted with the tact her parents toid Detective Kuggard 
they, at no time, requested he put medication on Melissa, nor were there any medicai problems of 
which they were aware, the suspect continued to insist this was the case, indicating he was oniy 
trying to assist Melissa. 
Mr. Krebs then went on to state he believes this whole situation has been instigated by the 
victim's mother, who for some reason does not like his family. He stated he and his mother have 
been primarily responsible for the care of Melissa, as well as her siblings, as her mother and 
father (his brother) have not provided appropriate care to the children. 
The defendant was explained the importance of being honest about his conduct in this situation, 
and also confronted with the fact he has entered a plea of guilty to a sexual crime involving a 
child (although a reduced charge). The defendant stated he only entered a plea of guilty at the 
recommendation of his attorney, advising he did so. "So I won't have to go to prison." Mr. 
Krebs was asked if he understands the Coun may still sentence him to prison, or a jail term, and 
stated he did understand this, but offered the opinion his attorney had toid him this was unlikely, 
if he would enter a plea of guilty and agree to go to counseling. 
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KREBS, GEORGE W. 
COMMENTS: (continued) 
The defendant stated he has been participating in counseling through LDS Social Services, but 
acknowledged it is not a sexual offender treatment program. Instead, he stated his counseling 
has focused on the stress he and his family have experienced at the false charges which were 
filed against him. When asked if he has been participating in the Pre-Trial Services group for 
individuals charged with sexual crimes against childrerL the defendant stated he was asked :o go 
to that group by his Pre-Trial Services counselor, Teresa, but. *4My attorney talked to diem and 
diey told me I didn't have to go anymore." 
Mr. Krebs also admitted his attorney referred him for a psycho-sexual evaluation to Dr. Larry 
Fox, Center for Family DeveiopmenL Mr. Krebs stated he had not seen a copy of the evaluation, 
but indicared he believed his attorney had a copy. This investigator requested he sign a release of 
information so the evaluation could be obtained from Dr. Fox, and the defendant agreed. 
During further conversation. Mr. Krebs stated he does not feel he has any sexual problems for 
which he is in need of treatment and denied he has ever been sexually attracted to the victim, or 
any other child. Nevertheless, he stated he would cooperate tiiily with any orders of the Co un if 
he were to be considered for che privilege of probation. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Interview with the defendant. 
VTCTTM IMPACT STATEMENT: 
This investigator spoke with Ms. Cindy Krebs, mother of the victim. She stated Melissa is 
currently participating in counseling, but is still experiencing problems as a result of the abuse. 
She stated Melissa remains confused and angry over the abuse, and the fact the defendant has 
continued to deny the abuse actually occurred, instead blaming her and*her parents for either 
fabricating the information, or by staring he was only, trying to provide medical care to Melissa. 
She stated Melissa's anger has resulted in her being controlling and angry toward her younger 
siblings, indicating this has made the family situation even more difficult Additionally, she 
stated Melissa feels very badly about the feet her grandparents do not believe her, and have not 
supported her. Ms. Krebs stated the situation with the grandparents has been difficult for ail of 
the children, advising her in-laws refuse to visit the residence to see the grandchildren and of 
course, the children cannot go to their home because the defendant is there. 
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
KRE3S, GEORGE W. 
VTCTIM IMPACT STATEMENT: (continued) 
Ms. Krebs stated she and her husband have encouraged her in-laws to participate in family 
activities with them and the children, but stated her mother-in-law's resnonse has been, "How 
can we participate in things with you and leave George out?" 
Ms. Krebs stated the defendant has great suppon for his denial of responsibility of this offense or 
any accompanying sexual problems, particularly from his mother. She stated his father prefers 
not to talk about the situation, and often fails asleep when family arguments occur. Ms. Krebs 
indicated this situation, in addition to being difficult for Melissa and the other children, has b^n 
extremely difficult for her husband as he has had to choose between 'supporting his daughter, and 
having a relationship with his mother and father. Ms. Krebs indicated her husband has made 
Melissa his priority, and has sxaied if his parents cannot understand what type of problems are 
present in this situation, and encourage the defendant to resolve them, rather than to deny them, 
he does not wish to have a relationship with his parents. 
Ms. Krebs indicated hers, her husband's and Melissa's only desire throughout this situation has 
been to ensure die defendant receive the treatment which he needs, so he does not revictimize 
Melissa, the other children in the family, or any other children in the community. She indicated 
it was a difficult decision to report this matter to her religious authorities, and subsequently to the 
Division of Family Services, knowing her mother-in-law would be very angry and would deny 
the crime. Nevertheless, Ms. Krebs stated Melissa's safety, and the safety of other children must 
be their priority, and advised shQ is glad they have followed through with the prosecution of this 
matter, even though it has caused great difficulties within die family. 
Ms. Krebs stated her preference, ail along, has been the defendant acknowledge his problem and 
his culpability in this crime and receive appropriate treatment: however, she stated she 
understands, without the defendant's acknowledgment there is a problem, treatment will be 
ineffective, and he will remain a risk to reoffend. Based on that, Ms. Krebs stated she would 
support whatever recommendation the Department of Corrections and the Court felt appropriate, 
indicating her primary concern is her daughter's stable mental health and continued progress in 
treatment 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Interview with Ms. Cindy Krebs. 
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KREBS, GEORGE W. 
RESTTTUTTON: 
At this point in rime, Ms. Krebs stated Melissa is participating in counseiing through LDS Social 
Services and shQ and her husband are paying the cost of ±e counseiing. She did not have an 
exact amount accrued thus far, but stated she would provide it to this department at a later date. 
The defendant should be required to reimburse the victim's family and/or any other agency or 
entity for all treatment expenses for Melissa which have accrued thus far. and which will 
continue to accrue in the future. Additionally, the defendant shouid also be required to pay 
counseling expenses for any other of the victim's family, including her mother, father and 
siblings, who need to receive treatment to resolve problems associated with this situation. If 
there is any dispute over the amount, a restitution hearing should be 4aQlcL 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
•vis. Cindy Krefas. 
LAW ENFORCEMENT STATEMENT: 
This investigator had been unable to reach Detective Kuggard for his comments, as of the date of 
dictation. If information is obtained prior to sentencing, it will be forwarded. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
None. 
CUSTODY STATUS: 
The defendant was in custody for eight hours prior to his release to Pre-Triai Services . 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:' 
Records of the Salt Lake County Jail. 
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KRE3S, GEORGE W. 
CRIMINAL RECORD 
JUVENILE RECORD: 
The defendant was not referred for criminal offenses as a juvenile. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Records of the Utah State Juvenile Court. 
ADULT RECORD: 
Records of the Utah 3ureau of Criminal Identification indicate this to be the defendant's first 
adult arrest of record. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Utah Bureau of Criminal Identification (no record); Federal Bureau of Investigations 
(FBI No. 805409 AB4); Salt Lake County Sheriffs OfSce (SO No. J-
PENDING CASES: 
There were no pending cases found for this defendant. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Records of the Third Circuit Court. 
PROBATION/PAROLE HISTORY: 
Mr. Krefas has never been under probation or parole supervision. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Records of the Utah State Department of Corrections. 
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KRE3S. GEORGE W. 
BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION: 
The defendant repons being bom and raised in Murray, Utah He is the second of three boys and 
was brought up in an intact family. During the defendant's childhood his father was employed 
by the Kennecott Copper Corporation, retiring after twenty-eight years. Tn^ defendant's mother 
is a receptionist for the Utah Legal Services. 
>/fr. Krehs repons an excellent relationship with all family members, stating, uWe do everything 
together." He denies he was ever sexually or physically abused during his childhood and reports 
being well provided for, financially. He indicated discipline within the family was "spanking 
when we were little, none when I was older. 1 never did anything Wrong/7 
The defendant indicated the only trauma within the family has been the current legal situation, as 
well as themany medical problems his mother has experienced over the years. He stated it was 
primarily due to those medical problems that it was necessary for him to take care of Melissa and 
her siblings. Nevertheless, he did acknowledge his mother's medical problems axe not such that 
she is unable to maintain full-time employment. 
Regarding his relationship with his oldest brother, Melissa's father, the defendant stated "We 
have talked a couple of times. He doesn't say much. Ke listens to his wife." 
Currently, Mr. Krebs is residing in the home of his parents in Murray, Utah, as is his younger 
brother. He stated the only time he has lived outside the family home was when he performed a 
mission for the LDS Church to South Korea. He stated this was a verv rewarding experience. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant; character reference letters submitted bv family and friends. 
MARITAL HISTORY: 
The defendant has never been married, and has no children. He staled he does not date at this 
time, and has not since he attended Salt Lake Community College. He indicated his lack of 
social interaction with age appropriate females is due to the feci, "It's difficult to meet kids of my 
age in my religion- Most are away at college.7' When confronted with the fact he is now thirty-
four years old and should not be daring "college kids" anyway, the defendant corrected himself, 
and stated he feels it is difficult to meet females who have his same moral and religious ideals, 
and for this reason, has not dated recently. 
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MARITAL HISTORY: (continued) 
The defendant reports he has never been sexually involved with an age appropriate adult 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant 
EDUCATION: 
Mr. Krefas graduated from Murray High School and then completed four years at Salt Lake 
Community College studying computer inionnarion rechnoiogy. He indicates he is three credits 
short of obtaining an .Associates Degree; however, is not currently artending college. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant; copy of educational transcripts. 
HEALTH 
PHYSICAL HEALTH: 
The defendant reports he is in generally good physical health, but does suffer from low grade 
asthma for which he is prescribed an inhaler. He reports no other major illnesses nor injuries. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant 
MENTAL / EMOTIONAL HEALTH: 
As of the date of the presentence interview, Mr. Krebs indicated he hM participated in one 
counseling session with Mr. Ross Clement, LCSW, LDS Social Services, Sandy Unit. The 
defendant was asked why, if he enrolled in LDS Social Services, he did not seek the services of 
the sexual offender treatment program which is located in the downtown unit. He staled he did 
not, as he believes he does not have sexual problems: however, stated he would change 
counselors if so ordered-by. the Court. 
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MENTAL / EMOTIONAL HEALTH: (continued) 
At the recommendation of his attorney, Mr. Krebs underwent a psycho-sexual evaluation which 
was prepared by Dr. Larry Fox, Center for Family Development. The Center for Family 
Development is a specialized sexual offender treatment program and Dr. Fox does complete 
numerous psycho-sexual evaluations for the Department of Corrections and the Courts; however, 
as this evaluation was not completed through the contract process which the Department of 
Corrections holds with the Center for Family Development, a release of information was 
obtained from Mr. Krebs and the report was forwarded. 
In the Summary section of the evaluation, Dr. Fox indicates the defendant does acknowledge 
touching the victim on the anus and vaginal area on at least fifty occasions; however, denies this 
was sexually motivated or that he received any gratification from it. He reported instead, he was 
either applying medication to Melissa, or was "checking to see if she aeeded medication 
applied." The defendant denied a need for any treatment relating to sexual problems during the 
evaluation. 
Dr. Fox found the defendant had an average intellect and as a result, should have the cognitive 
capaciry to understand the wrongfulness of his conduct. He also described the defendant as a 
:itightiy constricted individual/' who demonstrated he will attempt to maintain an image of 
propriety, virtue and self control, even under the most adverse circumstances. Dr. Fox felt the 
best example of this was the defendant's description of his emotional status as u5ne," when he 
was being evaluated regarding a charge of a sexual nature which, if convicted as charged, could 
result in mandated imprisonment. 
Dr. Fox also found the defendant attempted to present himself as moral and upright regarding his 
views on sexuality. He also appeared "so constricted he fails to acknowledge sexual fantasy or 
sexual interests." This included the defendant denying he had ever experienced sexual fantasy, 
had ever looked at any type of pornography including a Playboy or a Penthouse magazine, had 
never masturbated, and had no interest in having sexual intercourse. The defendant also reported* 
having not daied within at least the past three years. 
Dr. Fox indicated, although none of the test results could be interpreted to specifically imply the 
defendant was guilty of a sexual crime (evaluation was completed prior to the plea of guilty 
being entered), he indicated, given the defendant's characteristic trait to conform to the moral 
expectations of others, it was most unlikely he would be willing to admit to any wrongdoing, 
even if he had behaved in a sexually inappropriate manner. 
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MENTAL / EMOTIONAL HEALTH: (continued) 
Dr. Fox also reported it was "equally unlikely the defendant would be willing to acknowledge he 
has a sexual behavior problem or be willing to participate in related therapy." 
There is ao piethysmograph evaluation included in Dr. Fox's report, as Mr. Krebs declined to 
participate in the arousal assessment portion of the psycho-sexual evaluation. 
Mr. Krebs reports he has not participated in mental health treatment or assessment in die past, 
other than that related to his current legal circumstances. He reports he has never attempted 
suicide. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant; psycho-sexual evaluation completed by Dr. Larry Fox. 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
ALCOHOL HISTORY: 
Mr. Krebs stated he does not use alcohol at this time, and denied he has done so in the past. Ke 
reported no family history of alcoholism. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant; psycho-sexual evaluation completed by Dr. Larry Fox. 
DRUG HISTORY: 
Past or current use of illegal drugs was denied by Mr. Krebs. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant; psycho-sexual evaluation completed by Dr. Larry Fox, 
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EMPLOYMENT HISTORY: 
The defendant's Social Security Number is: 528-19-6401. 
The defendant is currently employed by the Sait Lake Clinic as a lead computer operator, earning 
S11.00 per hour. He has been so employed since April of 1988. He works approximately forty 
hours per week. Previous employment reported is as follows: 
REASON 
EMPLOYER TITLE WAGE START/END FOR LEAVING 
Judkins Company Billing Clerk S4.00/Hr 01-85 /10-86 *ROF 
Soft TaLk Inc. Assembiytine S4.00/Kx 11-82/05-83 ROF 
NOTE: 
The defendant reported periods of unemployment between 1983 and 1985, and again between 
1986 and 1988, me rime which he obtained the employment with Sait Lake Clinic. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant; copies of verification letters from defendant's employer. 
FINANCIAL SITUATION: 
The defendant reported a monthly income of S2,000.00. He reported total monthly obligations of 
approximately S750.00. He reported no debts, and asses in savings of 32,000.00 and SI 1,000.00 
in a retirement plan. He also has a 1988 Ford vehicle of an undetermined, value. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Tne defendant. 
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MTLITARY RECORD: 
Mr. Krebs has never been a member of the United States military. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant 
COLLATERAL CONTACTS: 
This investigator spoke with Mr. James Cope, the4H£SSSH?nS attorney. Mr. Cope stated on 
06-07-96 he received a signed motion filed b^MT. Chacon: and the defendant, requesting the 
defendant be allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty in this matter. Mr. Cope stated, if the Coun 
does ailow the withdrawal of the plea of guilty, he feels confident the victim can successfully 
testify during a trial. He stated Melissa and her parents were prepared for the matter to go to trial 
with the plea being originally negotiated only days before the trial was scheduled. 
Mr. Cope indicated, in his view, if the defendant continues to maintain he has no sexual 
problems, and did not touch and digitally penetrate the victim for sexual reasons, then he is not 
amenable to treatment, and should not be considered for the privilege of probation. Mr. Cope 
indicated the defendant's current attitude regarding this situation indicaies he is a risk to children 
in this community. 
This investigator attempted to reach Mr. Chacon for his input on this matter, but he was not 
available at the time the calls were placed. Two messages were left on his answering machine, 
but had not been responded to as of the date of dictation. If information is obtained, it will be 
forwarded. 
This investigator attempted to reach the defendant's mother, Ms. Evelyn Krebs; however, had 
been unsuccessful in doing so as of the date of dictation. The defendant included only his 
mother's home telephone number, apparently as she preferred not to be contacted about this 
matter at her place of employment If information is obtained prior to sentencing, it will be 
forwarded. 
PAGE 16 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
KREBS, GEORGE W. 
COLLATERAL CONTACTS: (continued) 
Attached for the Court's review are numerous character reference letters submitted on this 
defendant's behalf from friends and family members. Also attached are two letters of 
verification from his employers at the Salt Lake Clinic, as well as letters from his religious 
officials including his LDS bishop, and his stake president. This investigator has read each and 
every one of these letters. It is noted ail verbalized significant support for the defendant, and a 
majority offered the opinion the defendant could not possibly be guilty of this crime, and that it 
is a situation which has been fabricated by the victim's mother. They based this opinion on the 
fact the defendant is a "wonderiui person.7' 
EVALUATIVE SUMMARY: 
Now appearing before die Court for sentencing is Mr. George Krebs, a thirty-four year old male. 
In this matter he entered a plea of guilty to one count of Attempted Sexual Abuse of a Child- a 
Third Degree Felony, having been originally charged with one ccunt of Aggravated Sexual 
Abuse of a Child, a First Degree Felony carrying a mandatory minimum imprisonment term. 
This Is Mr. Krebs's first adult arrest and conviction of record. 
In this situation, the defendant sexually abused his niece, Melissa Krebs, over a period of at least 
six years, by repeatedly fondling Melissa's vaginal area and buttocks, and by digitally 
penetrating her anally and vaginally. The victim originally reported the abuse when she was six 
years old, but her mother and grandmother (the defendant's mother) thought she was either 
confused or "kidding," and disregarded the disclosure. The abuse was reported again by Melissa 
at age twelve after the defendant continually touched her at a family party and tried to get her to 
go into the bedroom with him so he could "check her." This time, the victim'smother referred 
Melissa for counseling, the matter was reported to the Division of Family Services and 
subsequendy to law enforcement 
Melissa does seem to be receiving significant support and protection from her mother and father, 
but has-been greatly traumatized by the prolonged abuse, and the ensuing chaos within the family 
since the disclosure and the report to authorities. 
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EVALUATIVE SUMMARY: (continued) 
Melissa's grandparents, who are the parents of the defendant, have terminated all contact with 
Melissa, her siblings and her parents, preferring instead to support the defendant's denial of 
responsibility for the offense. This has been particularly difficult for Melissa's father, as he was 
apparently quite close to his parents and siblings; however, he also believes the protection of his 
daughter must be a priority and feels if his parents will not support Melissa or protect the other 
children in the family, then having no contact is appropriate. 
Melissa's mother and father are concerned about the defendant's attitude regarding this situation 
and about the support he has received from family and friends for his denial. Cindy Krebs, 
Melissa's mother, indicates, at no time, did she or her husband request the defendant put 
medicine on Melissa's vaginal area, the excuse the defendant is giving for his sexually abusive 
behavior. Tacv believe the defendant is a verv troubled oerson who is in need of long term 
therapy, but realized counseling cannot impact the defendant's problems, unless he is willing to 
recognize they exist. The victim is participating in counseling, and it appears it would be heipfiii 
for her parents to also receive some supportive services. 
The defendant was raised in an intact family and reports no abuse as a child. He continues to 
reside in his parents' residence, leaving only to complete an LDS Church mission. He is 
gainfully employed in a full-time capacity, and this investigator has confirmed his employers are 
aware of his involvement in this offense. 
The defendant has never married, has no children, and does not date. During the psycho-sexual 
evaluation, he reported no outlet for his sexual feelings, and in fact, denied having sexual 
feelings, fantasies, or interest in sexual activities. It is likely this very rigid attitude about sexual 
matters has been a factor in the defendant's sexually abusive conduct toward his niece, and is 
also a factor in his denial of any sexual problems. Additionally, the psycho-sexual evaluation 
states, because of the rigidity of the defendant's personality characteristics, and denial of any 
problems, he will be uniikeiy to acknowledge the problems in the future, and as a result is a poor 
candidate for therapy. 
The defendant's assertion he was only trying to assist the victim by putting medicine on her 
vaginal and anal area, rather than engaging in abusive conduct, is at best, naive,' particularly if he 
believes the criminal justice system would believe this statement The type of abuse which the 
defendant-engaged in, and the long term nature of the behavior, indicates he is a highly disturbed 
individual who poses a very real risk to children, more so because his denial of any problems, 
and because of the support he has from family, friends and religious officials for the denial. 
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EVALUATIVE SUMMARY: (continued) 
As long as the defendant maintains this altitude he will remain a risk to reonend and he will not 
be amenable to treatment As such, it is feit the only appropriate recommendation at this time is 
Ions term incarceration. 
RE-SPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
tATHERJuNE C SHEPHERD, INVESTIGATOR 
i 
APPROVED, 
^ AX •••o 





Psycho-sexual evaluation completed by Dr. Larry Fox 
Collateral contact letters 
AGENCY RECOMMEiSDATION 
In the matter of GEORGE W. KREBS, it is respecrfuily recommended by die staff of Adult 
Probation and Parole, the defendant be committed forthwith to die Utah State Prison for die term 
prescribed by law for diis offense. It is further recommended he be responsible for all counseling 
expenses for die victim, or for any family members who may need treatment to resolve problems 
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views, V.Supp.R. 1031-33, 1125, 1133, and 
further testified that he had never seen nor 
heard of a prisoner using a mop handle as a 
weapon, id. at 1119-20. We find that Plain-
tiff, securely locked by himself in a maximum 
security cell, was not confined under condi-
tions posing a substantial risk of serious 
harm notwithstanding the fact that an inmate 
located outside the cell succeeded in inflicting 
injury upon him. 
The evidence further indicates that Plain-
tiff likewise perceived himself to be immune 
from harm due to his confinement behind the 
steel barrier of his maximum security cell. 
MacKay's only weapon was a mop handle 
which, together with the diameter of the 
aperture of the window permitting contact 
between Plaintiff and MacKay, suggests that 
Plaintiff had many ways to protect himself 
from serious harm. He could have placed his 
mattress against the broken window as a 
shield; retreated into the depths of his cell; 
crawled under his bed; crouched beneath the 
broken window against the steel door to 
avoid exposure to MacKay; or turned his 
back to MacKay and covered his head and 
neck area. The evidence shows that instead 
of protecting himself Plaintiff placed himself 
in a position of danger and even continued to 
taunt MacKay and poke at MacKay through 
the broken window. He neither recognized 
nor anticipated the harm that occurred. The 
fact that MacKay injured Plaintiff, standing 
alone, is not nearly enough to satisfy this 
first prong of the Farmer test. Any factual 
findings to the contrary are clearly errone-
ous. 
The prison regulations further suggest 
that Plaintiffs incarceration in his solitary 
maximum security cell did not constitute con-
ditions posing a substantial risk of serious 
harm. The regulations call for the immedi-
ate deployment of nonlethal force in three 
situations: (1) an inmate injuring another 
inmate while both are in a common cell; (2) 
an inmate injuring another while both are in 
a common area; and (3) an inmate causing 
damage to the facility while in a common 
area. Aplee.Supp.App. 252 (FG 25/03.01(0). 
The fact that these regulations do not apply 
to the situation involved in this case, i.e., an 
inmate in the common area attempting to 
inflict injury on an inmate securely lockeij 
a maximum security cell, indicates that sot 
a situation was not perceived to be one t b 
posed a substantial risk of injury to an* it 
mate.
 %rr^ 
As the magistrate judge correctly notei 
various other tactics or responses to the db 
turbance caused by Plaintiff and MacKaj 
including the deployment of force, may hav 
prevented Plaintiffs injury. However, ifc*j 
immaterial whether the Officers' pursue 
what in retrospect appears to be the mos 
effective response if Plaintiff was not incai 
cerated under conditions posing a substantia 
risk of serious harm. While we are symps 
thetic to Plaintiffs grievous injury, the issu 
is not whether Defendant Officers woul 
have prevented Plaintiffs injury had the; 
pursued an alternative course of actioni Be 
cause Plaintiffs incarceration did not subjec 
him to a substantial risk of serious ham 
Defendant Officers' response to the inriden 
in which Plaintiff was injured did not violati 
the Eighth Amendment. 
REVERSED. 
UNITED STATES of America, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Victor Lyn HAWLEY, Defendant-
Appellant. 
No. 95-3061. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit 
Aug. 19, 1996. 
Defendant pled guilty to conspiring^ 
possess and intent to distribute methamphejj 
amme and the United States District Courj 
for the District of Kansas, Sam A. Crow^jJj 
sentenced defendant to 97 months' incarcer^ 
tion. Defendant appealed. The Court .oj 
Appeals, Ebel, Circuit Judge, 
enhancing defendant's sentence for obstruc-
tion of justice after appearance bond forfei-
ture did not violate double jeopardy; (2) de-
fendant's failure to appear at court hearing, 
flight from jurisdiction, and failure to volun-
tarily return justified refusal to reduce de-
fendant's base offense level for acceptance of 
responsibility; and (3) remand to determine 
whether plea should be vacated or defendant 
resentenced was proper remedy for govern-
ment's breach of plea agreement 
Affirmed in part and remanded. 
1. Criminal Law <s=*1139,1158(1) 
Sentencing court's factual findings as to 
obstruction of justice are reviewed on appeal 
using clearly erroneous standard and sen-
tencing court's legal interpretation of sen-
tencing guideline is reviewed de novo. 
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1,18 U.S.OA. 
1 Criminal Law <®=»1139 
Legal conclusion concerning double jeop-
ardy reached during sentencing proceeding 
is reviewed de novo on appeal. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 5. 
3. Double Jeopardy <£=»5.1 
Fifth Amendment guarantee against 
double jeopardy protects against second 
prosecution for same offense and against 
multiple punishments for same offense. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 5. 
4. Double Jeopardy <3=*25 
Forfeiture of bail bond is civil proceed-
ing arising from criminal one in determining 
whether forfeiture of bond violates double 
jeopardy. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 5. 
5. Double Jeopardy <3=>23, 25 
Civil sanction may be considered punish-
nient for purposes of double jeopardy when it 
subjects offender to sanction that is over-
whelmingly disproportionate to damages 
caused and when civil penalty bears no ra-
tional relation to goal of compensating gov-
ernment for its loss. U.S.C JL Const .Amend. 
5. 
U.S. v. HAWLEY 6 8 3 
Cite as 93 F.3d 682 (10th Cir. 1996) 
held that: (1) 6. Double Jeopardy ^ 2 5 
Not every monetary civil penalty that 
exceeds actual financial loss is per se punish-
ment in determining whether civil sanction 
violates double jeopardy protection. 
U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 5. 
7. Double Jeopardy <®=»25 
Forfeiture of $50,000 appearance bond 
when defendant failed to make scheduled 
appearance was remedial civil sanction, rath-
er than punishment and, thus, did not pose 
double jeopardy bar to subsequent enhance-
ment of defendant's sentence for obstruction 
of justice; defendant's failure to appear de-
layed timely disposition of case and warrant 
had to be issued for defendant's arrest in 
order to bring him back to jurisdiction. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 5; U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, 
18 U.S.OA. 
8. Criminal Law <^1244 
Sentencing range for offense is calculat-
ed, under Sentencing Guidelines, on basis of 
all relevant conduct in which defendant was 
engaged, and is not limited to conduct under-
lying offense of conviction. U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.3,18 U.S.C.A. 
9. Double Jeopardy ®=»30 
Enhancing drug conspiracy defendant's 
base offense level by two levels for obstruc-
tion of justice was punishment for underlying 
drug conspiracy offense,and did not consti-
tute punishment for defendant's previous 
failure to appear in court or violate double 
jeopardy when sentence was enhanced after 
forfeiture of $50,000 appearance bond. 
U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 5; U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, 
18 U.S.OA. 
10. Criminal Law <3=»1158(1) 
Sentencing court's refusal to grant re-
duction in offense level for acceptance of 
responsibility is reviewed on appeal for clear 
error. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1,18 U.S.C.A. 
11. Criminal Law <S*1252 
Defendant's violation of appearance 
bond, flight from jurisdiction, and failure to 
voluntarily return to jurisdiction precluded 
reduction in base offense level for acceptance 
of responsibility, even if defendant provided 
government with information concerning oth-
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er criminal activity and entered guilty plea 
on his return. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, 18 U.S.CJL 
12. Criminal Law <S=>1139 
Whether government conduct violates 
plea agreement is question of law which is 
reviewed de novo on appeal. 
13. Criminal Law <3=U34(3) 
Defendant's alleged substantial assis-
tance in investigation and prosecution of oth-
ers, and prosecutor's failure to move for 
downward departure sentence were not sub-
ject to judicial review; prosecutor had sole 
discretion in deciding whether to file motion 
for substantial assistance and there was no 
showing that government had unconstitution-
al motive for refusing to file motion on defen-
dant's behalf. U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, 18 U.S.CA 
14. Criminal Law <3=>273.1(2) 
Government violated its obligation under 
plea agreement not to oppose a three-level 
reduction of defendant's offense level for ac-
ceptance of responsibility and not to advocate 
an enhancement of defendant's offense level 
for obstruction of justice; government's nega-
tive comments at sentencing with regard to 
whether case was "extraordinary" had effect 
of opposing defendant's receipt of adjustment 
for acceptance of responsibility and govern-
ment's comments did not merely correct in-
accurate information but characterized facts 
and argued conclusions to persuade sentenc-
ing court in a way it had promised it would 
not do. U.S.S.G. §§ 3C1.1, 3E1.1, 3E1.1, 
comment, (n.4), 18 U.S.CA. 
15. Criminal Law <5=»273.1(2) 
When plea agreements are made with 
full knowledge of facts at hand, those agree-
ments must be adhered to by prosecution in 
order to maintain integrity of plea. 
16. Criminal Law <5=*1181.5(3.1) 
Remand for determination of whether 
defendant should be permitted to withdraw 
guilty plea, or simply be resentenced by an-
other judge, was proper remedy for govern-
ment's breach of its plea agreement obli-
gation not to oppose defendant's receipt of 
* After examining the bnefs and appellate record, 
this panel has determined unanimously to honor 
the parties' request for a decision on the bnefs 
three-level reduction for acceptance of<re?S 
sponsibility and not to advocate enhancement 
for obstruction of justice. U.S.S.G. §§ 3Cmt 
3E1.1, 3E1.1, comment (n.4), 18 U.S.C^ 
Submitted on the briefs:* 
David J. Phillips, Federal Public Defender 
and Marilyn M. Trubey, Assistant Federal 
Public Defender, Topeka, Kansas, for Defend 
dant-Appellant. 
Randall K. Rathbun, United States Attor-* 
ney and Gregory G. Hough, Assistant United^ 
States Attorney, Topeka, Kansas, for Plaint 
tiff-Appellee. 
Before BALDOCK, EBEL, and HENRY* 
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EBEL, Circuit Judge. 
On August 4,1994, a grand jury returned*ar* 
two-count indictment against Defendant-Ap^ 
pellant Victor Lyn Hawley and James Lope$ 
Guardado, charging that on or about the 25gr 
day of July, 1994, through the 28th day of 
July, 1994, they conspired to possess with* 
intent to distribute 100 grams or more' 6C 
methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled** 
substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
and that they possessed with the intent to~ 
distribute 100 grams or more of metham-# 
phetamine, to wit: approximately 440 grams\ 
of methamphetamine, a Schedule II co&| 
trolled substance, in violation of 21 U.S."C^ 
§ 841(a)(1). On November 3, 1994, Hawley^ 
entered a plea of guilty to Count I for con-^  
spiracy and agreed to cooperate with lawf 
enforcement. In exchange, the governments 
dropped Count II. Hawley was sentenced' 
on February 6, 1995. His sentence included^ 
a term of incarceration of 97 months. Haw^ 
ley now appeals, alleging that the govenH-
ment breached its plea agreement "not to* 
oppose" certain sentencing adjustments ist-% 
vorable to the Defendant and to file a motion^ 
for downward adjustment for substantial as-^ 
sistance 'if appropriate." Hawley also| 
claims that enhancing his offense level, byg 
two points for obstruction of justice constitufc|5 
without oral argument. See Fed.R-App.P. 34(f/a| 
10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered! 
submitted without oral argument. 
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gd double jeopardy because judgment previ-
ously was entered against him on the same 
conduct when he violated his appearance 
bond. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm in part, reverse 
in part and remand for proceedings consis-
tent with this opinion. 
BACKGROUND 
On July 29, 1994, Hawley and Guardado 
had their first appearances before United 
States Magistrate Judge Ronald C. Newman 
relating to the above mentioned charges. At 
Hawley s detention hearing on August 1, 
1994, Judge Newman released Hawley on a 
$50,000 unsecured bond payable to the Unit-
ed States upon failure to appear as ordered. 
In the appearance bond, Hawley agreed to 
appear at all scheduled appearances in the 
case. Judge Newman also advised Hawley 
that his next appearance date was August 16, 
1994, at 9:00 a.m. at the U.S. District Court 
in Topeka, Kansas for arraignment. 
On August 16, 1994, Hawley failed to ap-
pear at his arraignment On that same day, 
Judge Newman signed an order forfeiting 
Hawley*s bond and directing issuance of a 
bench warrant for Hawiey's arrest. On Au-
gust 24, 1994, United States District Court 
Judge Sam Crow signed an order granting 
the United States' motion for judgment on 
bond forfeiture in the Hawley matter. Haw-
ley was eventually arrested again on Septem-
ber 9, 1994, in Arkansas, and he was arraign-
ed on September 30, 1994, before Judge 
Newman. After a hearing on the United 
States' motion for revocation of Hawiey's 
pretrial release, on October 6, 1994, Judge 
Newman revoked Hawiey's pretrial release 
and entered an order of detention. 
On November 3,1994, Hawley, as part of a 
plea agreement with the United States Attor-
ney's office, entered a plea of guilty to Count 
I of the indictment. At that time, Hawley 
stipulated to facts sufficient to prove him 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the of-
fense charged in Count I of the indictment.1 
In addition to pleading guilty to Count I of 
1. Those facts were summarized as follows: On 
July 28, 1994, Hawley and Guardado were de-
tained during a routine traffic stop by a Kansas 
State Highway Trooper. The trooper discovered 
the indictment, Hawley agreed to provide 
information about the matters charged in the 
indictment in this case and to submit to a 
polygraph examination on the information 
provided. In exchange for Hawiey's plea, 
the government agreed to dismiss Count II 
of the indictment; "to not oppose that [Haw-
leyl receive a three level reduction" for ac-
ceptance of responsibility; "to not oppose 
that [Hawley] not receive a two level en-
hancement for obstruction of justice;" and "if 
appropriate, prior to sentencing," to file a 
motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 for any 
substantial assistance provided pursuant to 
the agreement. 
Prior to sentencing, Hawley learned that 
the government did not intend to file a mo-
tion for a downward departure based on 
substantial assistance. He then filed a mo-
tion to enforce the plea agreement because 
he had provided information to law enforce-
ment. In addition, he filed a motion to con-
tinue the sentencing hearing scheduled for 
January 20, 1995. The district court, in 
chambers, held a hearing concerning matters 
that were relevant to Hawiey's ability to 
provide information pursuant to the plea 
agreement. Hawley argued that he had 
been debriefed by the DEA subsequent to 
his entering a plea, and that he had provided 
information regarding drug activities in Cali-
fornia and Arkansas. He further argued 
that, notwithstanding assurances from cer-
tain law enforcement officials in Arkansas 
that Hawley was still valuable to investiga-
tions there, his ability to provide information 
regarding drug activities in Arkansas had 
been compromised by law enforcement, and 
he suggested there was reason to suspect 
that law enforcement themselves were in-
volved in the drug activities. Hawley re-
quested that the court order an investigation 
to determine whether his "attempted" coop-
eration had been undermined by law enforce-
ment in any way. 
The court denied the motion to enforce the 
plea agreement on the government's repre-
sentation that no assistance had been provid-
440 grams of methamphetamine in the car and 
Hawley ultimately acknowledged participation in 
a conspiracy to distribute that methamphet-
amine. 
686 93 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES 
ed to date that would be deemed substantial. 
However, the court continued the sentencing 
hearing to allow for an investigation into 
whether federal agents and/or local law en-
forcement agents in Arkansas were engaged 
in any misconduct which precluded Hawley's 
cooperation. 
The matter proceeded to sentencing on 
February 6, 1995. Hawley again filed a mo-
tion to continue the sentencing hearing be-
cause reports from the earlier investigation 
had not been completed. In addition, he 
filed a renewed motion to enforce the plea 
agreement, incorporating the arguments 
from the earlier motion and stating in addi-
tion that he was now willing to provide the 
government with any information it desired, 
including information concerning his broth-
er's drug activities which he had declined to 
provide earlier. The government responded 
that the investigation by the FBI had prelim-
inarily indicated that the allegations made at 
the previous hearing were unsubstantiated. 
The government questioned Hawley's good 
faith claim of cooperation and stated that the 
information he had provided was not sub-
stantial and did not merit a downward depar-
ture motion. The court denied both of the 
motions made on behalf of Hawley. 
The court then determined the total of-
fense level applicable to Hawley to be 30. In 
calculating this base offense level, the court 
determined that a two-point enhancement for 
obstruction of justice was merited due to 
Hawley's failure to appear at a prior court 
hearing. Further, the court concluded that 
Hawley was not entitled to a downward ad-
justment for acceptance of responsibility. 
Hawley argued that the obstruction enhance-
ment was precluded under the Double Jeop^ 
ardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because 
judgment in the amount of $50,000 had been 
taken against him on his appearance bond 
based on conduct also used to apply the 
enhancement. Further, Hawley argued that 
he was entitled to an adjustment for accep-
tance of responsibility because he had coop-
erated with authorities subsequent to his ar-
rest and had timely entered a plea of guilty. 
The government acknowledged its obli-
gations under the plea agreement not to 
oppose an adjustment for acceptance of re-
sponsibility and not to argue in favor of an 
obstruction of justice enhancement. Howev-
er, the government went on to note that it 
was not aware of certain facts contained in 
the presentence report at the time of the 
plea agreement, and that the record did not 
indicate that this was a "circumstance merit-
ing any extraordinary credit." In light of the 
government's position, Hawley requested, 
that he be allowed to withdraw his plea due 
to the government's violation of the terms of 
the plea agreement. The court denied that 
request, concluded that the base offense level 
was accurately calculated at 30, and sen-
tenced Hawley to the custody of the Bureau 
of Prisons for a term of 97 months. 
On appeal, Hawley argues that: (1) He 
was subjected to double punishment for the 
same offense in violation of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause when the district court enhanced 
his base offense level by two levels for ofch 
struction of justice after previously entering 
judgment against him on his appearance^ 
bond for the same conduct; (2) The district 
court erred in not granting him a reduction 
in his base offense level for acceptance, of 
responsibility; (3) The district court erred in; 
denying his Motion To Enforce The Plea 
Agreement; and (4) The district court erred 




[1,2] The Sentencing Guidelines provide-; 
for a two-point increase in the base offense"^ 
level u[i]f the defendant willfully obstructed^ 
or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or inH; | 
pede, the administration of justice during 
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing" of >/; 
the instant offense." U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Ther% 
district court assessed this enhancement?^ 
against Hawley because he failed to appear^ 
for arraignment as ordered. Hawley conj^ 
tends this constitutes double punishment,iff^ 
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause be j^S 
cause judgment previously was entered|| 
against him on his $50,000 appearance bondg 
as a result of the same conduct We Tevi&fM 
the district court's factual findings as to.thefl 
obstruction of justice under the cleiHv prm^H 
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neous standard, and review de novo the dis-
trict court's legal interpretation of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines. United States v. Janus 
Industries, 48 F.3d 1548, 1559-60 (10th Cir.), 
cert denied. — U.S. , 116 S.Ct. 87, 133 
L.Ed.2d 44 (1995). We also review de novo 
the district court's legal conclusion regarding 
double jeopardy. United States v. Cardall, 
885 F.2d 656, 665 (10th Cir.1989). 
[3-5] The Fifth Amendment guarantee 
against double jeopardy protects against a 
second prosecution for the same offense and 
against multiple punishments for the same 
offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 
711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076-77, 23 L.Ed.2d 
656 (1969). Hawley's double jeopardy argu-
ment is based solely upon the latter protec-
tion against multiple punishments for the 
same offense. We have recognized that the 
forfeiture of a bail bond is a civil proceeding 
arising from a criminal one. United States v. 
BrouilH 736 F.2d 1414, 1415 (10th Cir. 
1984). However, the fact that a sanction is 
fairly characterized as "civil" does not mean 
that it can never constitute punishment for 
the purposes of double jeopardy analysis. 
The Supreme Court in United States v. Hal-
per, 490 U.S. 435, 447-^48, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 
1901-02, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), stated that: 
[T]he labels ''criminal" and "civil" are not 
of paramount importance. It is commonly 
understood that civil proceedings may ad-
vance punitive as well as remedial goals, 
and, conversely, that both may be served 
by criminal penalties [T]he determi-
nation of whether a given civil sanction 
constitutes punishment in the relevant 
sense requires a particularized assessment 
of the penalty imposed and the purposes 
that the penalty may fairly be said to 
serve. Simply put, a civil as well as a 
criminal sanction constitutes punishment 
when the sanction as applied in the individ-
ual case serves the goals of punishment. 
The rule announced in Halper is that a civil 
sanction may be considered punitive when it 
subjects the offender to a "sanction over-
2. The recent Supreme Court case of United States 
v. Ursery, U.S. , , 116 S.Ct. 2135. 
2149. 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996), is not directly 
dispositive because it held that in rem civil forfei-
tures do not implicate the Double Jeopardy 
Clause. Here, there was no in rem forfeiture 
whelmingly disproportionate to the damages 
he has caused . . . [and when] the civil penal-
ty . . . bears no rational relation to the goal 
of compensating the Government for its 
l o s s . . . . " Id. at 449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902; see 
also Department of Revenue v. Kurtk Ranch, 
511 U.S. 767, , 114 S.Ct. 1937, 
1947-48, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994) (relying on 
Halper to conclude that a state tax on illegal-
ly grown marijuana exacted punishment and 
not merely revenue).2 
The government argues that Hawley's bail 
bond was a form of contract between the 
government on the one hand and Hawley and 
his surety on the other. When Hawley vio-
lated the terms of his pretrial release he 
breached the contract with the government 
and the judgment entered in the govern-
ment's favor on the appearance bond was the 
government's remedy under the contract. 
The government argues that this civil sanc-
tion served a "remedial purpose," and was 
reasonably related to the government's dam-
ages. We agree. 
[6] The Court in Halper stated that 
courts should undertake a "particularized as-
sessment" of the civil penalty imposed and 
the purposes that the penalty may fairly be 
said to serve when determining whether a 
given civil sanction constitutes punishment. 
490 U.S. at 448, 109 S.Ct. at 1901-02. In 
making such an assessment, we note that not 
every monetary penalty exceeding actual fi-
nancial loss is per se punitive. "[T]he gov-
ernment is entitled to rough remedial justice, 
that is, it may demand compensation accord-
ing to somewhat imprecise formulas, such as 
reasonable liquidated damages or a fixed 
sum plus double damages, without being 
deemed to have imposed a second punish-
ment for the purpose of double jeopardy 
analysis." Id. at 446, 109 S.Ct. at 1900. 
[71 In this case, Hawley's failure to ap-
pear for a scheduled court proceeding de-
layed the timely disposition of this case. A 
because Hawley's appearance bond was unse-
cured: rather upon his breach of the terms of the 
bond an m personam judgment in the S50.000 
face amount of the bond was entered against 
him. 
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warrant had to be issued for Hawley's arrest 
in order to bring him back to the District of 
Kansas. Based on these facts, we conclude 
that the $50,000 judgment for violating the 
appearance bond was not overly dispropor-
tionate to the government's anticipated costs 
associated with being forced to delay Haw-
ley's criminal proceeding and hunt him down. 
Therefore, that judgment was remedial and 
not punitive, posing no double jeopardy bar 
to the enhancement of Hawley's sentence 
under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Cf. United States v. 
Barger, 458 F.2d 396, 396-97 (9th Cir.1972) 
(forfeiting bail compensates for damages and 
is deemed civil, not criminal in nature; 
hence, it does not implicate the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause when the defendant is also con-
victed of the crime of jumping bail); United 
States v. Garcia-Trevino, 843 F.Supp. 1134, 
1134-35 (S.D.Tex.1994) (applying Halper and 
concluding that "the entry of a civil judgment 
forfeiting a bond for failure to appear at trial 
solely serves a remedial purpose, not punish-
ment of the defendant, and therefore is not a 
bar to subsequent criminal prosecution for 
failure to appear based on the same con-
duct"). 
[8] Furthermore, in light of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Witte v. United States, 
— UJS. , 115 S.Ct 2199, 132 h.EdM 
351 (1995), we are compelled to conclude that 
the enhancement for obstruction of justice 
was not punishment for any conduct other 
than the conduct to which Hawley pleaded 
guilty. In Witte, the defendant pleaded 
guilty to a federal marijuana charge. — 
U.S. at , 115 S.Ct. at 2203. The presen-
tence report calculated the base offense level 
under the Sentencing Guidelines by aggre-
gating the total quantity of drugs involved, 
including drugs relating to uncharged crimi-
nal conduct, in this case, cocaine. Id. Un-
der the Guidelines, the sentencing range for 
an offense is calculated on the basis of all 
"relevant conduct" in which the defendant 
was engaged and is not limited to the con-
duct underlying the offense of conviction. 
U.S.S.G. § IB 1.3. When the defendant was 
subsequently indicted for offenses relating to 
his involvement with cocaine, he moved to 
dismiss the charges, arguing that he had 
already been punished for the offenses be-
cause the cocaine had been considered as 
"relevant conduct" at his marijuana sentetuif 
ing. Witte, — U.S. at , 115 S.Cfi^  
at 2203-04. Thus, defendant argued, the£ 
subsequent prosecution on cocaine charges^ 
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
[9] The Supreme Court rejected this iSk 
gument, holding that "use of evidence"^ 
related criminal conduct to enhance a deferiS 
dant's sentence for a separate crime within 
the authorized statutory limits does not cbn-J 
stitute punishment for that conduct within! 
the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause"** 
Id. at , 115 S.CL at 2206. Fiirtheraore,?' 
"it makes no difference . . . whether the ' en^ 
hancement occurred in the first or second,J 
sentencing proceeding." Id. 
The relevant conduct provisions oi the, 
Sentencing Guidelines, like their criminal 
history counterparts and the recidivism] 
statutes . . . , are sentencing enhancement 
regimes evincing the judgment that a par-
ticular offense should receive a more sen? 
ous sentence within the authorized range if? 
it was either accompanied by or preceded-
by additional criminal activity WS 
hold that, where the legislature has autho^ 
rized such a particular punishment ranges 
for a given crime, the resulting sentenced 
within that range constitutes punishment 
only for the offense of conviction for purj 
poses of the double jeopardy inquiry. a'\Z 
Id at , 115 S.Ct. at 2208. We conclude^ 
that the facts of this case are governed"!by] 
Witte. The enhancement of Hawley's sen^ 
tence under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 was punxsh| 
ment for the underlying offense to which h£ 
pleaded guilty, not punishment for failing toj 
appear. See also United States v. Carey't$i3ft 
F.2d 44, 46-47 (11th Cir.1991) (citing severalj 
other circuits and holding that a two Ievejj 
increase for obstruction of justice in^firsj* 
case relating to credit card fraud d o e s W 
constitute punishment for failure to appef 
and does not bar a later prosecution *jc 
failing to appear), cert denied, 503 U.S. .9 
112 S.Ct 1676,118 L.Ed.2d 394 (1992). ^'J 
ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY** 
[101 Hawley next argues that the dist 
court erred in not granting him a reductiojS 
in his base offense level for acceptance?.^ 
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district court's refusal to grant a reduction in 
offense level for acceptance of responsibility. 
United States v. Grey, 56 F.3d 1219, 1223 n. 
1 (10th Cir.1995). "We recognize that '[t]he 
sentencing judge is in a unique position to 
evaluate a defendant's acceptance of respon-
sibility. For this reason, the determination 
of the sentencing judge is entitled to great 
deference on review.'" United States v. 
Gacnik, 50 F.3d 848, 853 (10th Cir.1995) 
(quoting U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment, (n. 5)) 
(alteration in original). 
[11] U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 provides in rele-
vant part as follows: "(a) If the defendant 
clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsi-
bility for his offense, decrease the offense 
level by 2 levels." Application Note 3 to 
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 provides that entry of a 
plea of guilty prior to the commencement of 
trial combined with admission of the conduct 
of the offense of conviction and any other 
additional relevant conduct constitutes signif-
icant evidence of acceptance of responsibility. 
Application Note 3 goes on to say, however, 
that this evidence may be "outweighed by 
conduct of the defendant that is inconsistent 
with such acceptance of responsibility," and 
that the guilty plea does not entitle the de-
fendant to an adjustment as a matter of 
right Application Note 4 then advises that 
"[clonduct resulting in an enhancement un-
der § 3C1.1 (Obstructing or Impeding the 
Administration of Justice) ordinarily indi-
cates that the defendant has not accepted 
responsibility for his criminal conduct. 
There may, however, be extraordinary cases 
in which adjustments under both §§ 3C1.1 
and 3E1.1 may apply." 
The district court denied the § 3E1.1 
downward adjustment for acceptance of re-
sponsibility on the basis of Application Note 
4, concluding that there were no exceptional 
circumstances warranting a § 3E1.1 adjust-
ment in light of Hawley's conduct of flight 
that gave rise to an upward enhancement for 
obstructing justice under § 3C1.1. Hawley 
argues that, if he loses his double jeopardy 
challenge to the upward adjustment for ob-
structing justice (as he has), this is neverthe-
less one of those "extraordinary cases" where 
an adjustment under both §§ 3C1.1 and 
He relies principally 
on United States v. Hopper, 27 F.3d 378, 383 
(9th Cir.1994), where the Ninth Circuit held 
that an enhancement for obstruction of jus-
tice is not inconsistent with an acceptance of 
responsibility adjustment "when a defendant, 
although initially attempting to conceal the 
crime, eventually accepts responsibility for 
the crime and abandons all attempts to ob-
struct justice." Hawley contends that the 
conduct constituting obstruction of justice did 
not continue after he was received back into 
custody in September, 1994, and that upon 
his return to Kansas in late September, 1994, 
he immediately entered into negotiations 
with the government to provide information 
concerning other criminal activity and en-
tered his plea of guilty. Thus, the conduct 
forming the basis for the obstruction of jus-
tice enhancement ceased and was replaced 
by conduct indicating a clear acceptance of 
responsibility. 
In determining whether a defendant has 
"accepted responsibility," we have held that 
"the sentencing court can consider if there 
has been a Voluntary termination or with-
drawal from criminal conduct or associa-
tions.'" United States v. Amos, 984 F.2d 
1067, 1073 (10th Cir.1993) (quoting U.S.S.G. 
§ 3E1.1, Application Note 1(b)). In this 
case, assuming arguendo that Hawley accu-
rately characterizes his conduct after being 
returned to Kansas, there still remains the 
question as to whether his "good conduct" 
was in fact voluntary. Hawley fails to appre-
ciate the fact that he had been arrested, 
released on an appearance bond, and then 
violated his appearance bond. He had to be 
returned to Kansas by law enforcement; he 
did not return on his own. Conduct amount-
ing to escape or violation of an appearance 
bond is certainly evidence of failure to accept 
responsibility, and this fact alone provides 
adequate foundation for the district court's 
decision. See id. at 1072-73 (concluding that 
defendant's attempted escape from jail while 
awaiting sentencing supported application of 
enhancement for obstruction of justice and 
provided adequate grounds for denial of 
downward adjustment for acceptance of re-
sponsibility). Thus, notwithstanding Haw-
ley's emphasis on Hopper and his conduct 
after returning to Kansas, the district court 
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did not clearly err in its conclusion that 
Hawley failed to "clearly demonstrate[ ] ac-
ceptance of responsibility" entitling him to a 
reduction in his sentence under § 3E1.1. 
See U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a).3 
MOTION TO ENFORCE THE PLEA 
AGREEMENT 
[12] Hawley asserts that he was entitled 
to a motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 
(substantial assistance),4 and also that the 
government was required to file such motion 
pursuant to the plea agreement. He alleges 
that the government acted in bad faith in not 
filing the motion. Whether government con-
duct has violated a plea agreement is a ques-
tion of law which we review de novo. United 
States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1442 (10th 
Cir.), cert, denied, U.S. , 116 S.Ct. 
133, 133 L.Ed.2d 81 (1995). "[Pllea bargains 
are governed by contract principles, and if 
any ambiguities are present, they will be 
resolved against the drafter." United States 
v. Massey, 997 F.2d 823, 824 (10th Cir.1993) 
(citation omitted) (alteration in original). 
[13] In exchange for Hawley's plea of 
guilty to Count I of the indictment, the gov-
ernment made certain concessions. The con-
cession at issue here is found at paragraph 
7(D) of the Plea Agreement. In paragraph 
7(D) the government agreed: 
If appropriate, prior to sentencing, to file a 
motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, to 
reduce [Hawley's] sentence to reflect his 
substantial assistance, if any, in the inves-
3. Hawley also claims that he qualifies for the 
additional one-point downward adjustment un-
der subsection (b), which authorizes such an 
adjustment in the following situation: 
(b) If the defendant qualifies for a decrease un-
der subsection (a), the offense level deter-
mined prior to the operation of subsection (a) 
is level 16 or greater, and the defendant has 
assisted authorities in the investigation or 
prosecution of his own misconduct by taking 
one or more of the following steps: 
(1) timely providing complete information to 
the government concerning his own in-
volvement in the offense; or 
(2) timely notifying authorities of his intention 
to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting 
the government to avoid preparing for trial 
and permitting the court to allocate its 
resources efficiently. 
Because Hawley's entitlement to an adjustment 
under subsection (b) turns on whether he first 
tigation and/or prosecution of another per 
son(s) involved in this offense or othei 
offenses.... - /$ 
Paragraph 8, however, states that u[t]he de 
fendant acknowledges and understands tha 
the decision, whether to file this motion,. ari( 
whether he has provided substantial asas 
tance, is a matter that resides in the sole anc 
exclusive discretion of the United States'Al> 
torney for the District of Kansas." 
Hawley contends that he did "substantially 
assist" the government by: (1) providing; in. 
formation concerning the activities whicj 
formed the basis of the Indictment, both m 
California and Arkansas; (2) providing info$ 
mation to the court regarding conduct^S 
Arkansas which interfered with his ability to 
cooperate; and (3) expressing his willingness 
to provide information about his brothers 
drug activities. Hawley further contends 
that the government took no steps to have a 
polygraph examination administered to him 
concerning the information he provided'ana 
that the government conducted a "less than 
enthusiastic investigation" into his claims're| 
garding interference with his ability to cbpn-j 
erate before concluding them to be meritless 
The government responds that Hawley ^dS 
not substantially assist its investigationsfiap£ 
that after Hawley was returned to custody^ 
he "further obstructed justice by making] 
false allegations of law enforcement corru]H 
tion in Arkansas," which, upon investigation 
turned out to be fictitious.5 
meets the requirements of subsection (a)i whicH 
he has not done, we reject this argument as wellj 
4. U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 provides in part: "Upori'mo^ 
tion of the government stating that the defendant? 
has provided substantial assistance in the inyestis 
gation or prosecution of another person who'hafl 
committed an offense, the court may depart # o $ | 
the guidelines." 1' 
5. At the sentencing hearing the government^ 
informed the court that "there is evidencej' 
indicates that during the period oi time*'. 
[Hawley] was at-large between the time i""" 
failed to appear and subsequendy was ai 
knowing that the codefendant was providing^ 
formation, the defendant provided informau'bflj 
others, particularly his brother, indicating^ 
codefendant was providing information;'andL-j 
that manner obstructed the assistance of thetajj 
defendant." 
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The district court concluded that "the gov- the prosecutor, 
ernment has demonstrated it has abided by 
the terms of the plea agreement and the 
government has reasonably and apparently 
in good faith concluded that the information 
provided by the defendant is not sufficient to 
warrant the filing of a motion pursuant to 
§ 5K1.1, and the defendant's failure to—fail-
ure and inability to provide information that 
would substantially assist the government in 
its investigation of criminal activities clearly 
justify the government decision not to file a 
motion for a reduction of sentence for sub-
stantial assistance, and therefore, a motion to 
enforce the plea agreement is again denied." 
As with other decisions made by prosecu-
tors, "federal district courts have authority to 
review a prosecutor's refusal to file a sub-
stantial-assistance motion and to grant a 
remedy if they find that the refusal was 
based on an unconstitutional motive." Wade 
v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-36, 112 
S.Ct. 1840, 1843-44, 118 L.Ed2d 524 (1992) 
(staring as an example of an unconstitutional 
motive a situation where a prosecutor refuses 
to file a substantial-assistance motion be-
cause of the defendant's race or religion). 
uIt follows that a claim that a defendant 
merely provided substantial assistance will 
not entitle a defendant to a remedy or even 
to discovery or an evidentiary hearing. Nor 
would additional but generalized allegations 
of improper motive." Id. at 186, 112 S.Ct at 
.1844. "[A]bsent an unconstitutional motive 
for refusing to do so, the prosecution enjoys 
•complete discretion in determining whether 
to file a substantial assistance motion, and 
'—. a claim seeking to compel a motion based 
on a defendant's view of what he or she 
deems to have been 'substantial assistance' 
*fll not be entertained." Massey, 997 F.2d 
at 824 (citing Wade, 504 U.S. at 185-87, 112 
S.CL at 1844). 
' . We have stated that "Congress wisely or 
"Unwisely left the matter of substantial assis-
tance to the prosecutor, unless there's a for-
'
 m a l agreement which would bind the prose-
cutor." Massey, 997 F.2d at 824 (internal 
potation marks omitted). Under Hawley's 
Plea Agreement the decision whether to file 
^mot ion for substantial assistance resides 
•within the "sole and exclusive discretion" of 
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Hawley does not allege that 
the government in this case had an unconsti-
tutional motive for its refusal to file a motion 
for substantial assistance on his behalf. 
Thus, we lack jurisdiction to consider this 
claim further. See United States v. Gerber, 
24 F.3d 93, 95 (10th Cir,1994) (exercising 
jurisdiction to review "alleged constitutional 
infirmities arising from the prosecutor's dis-
cretionary refusal to file a § 5K1.1 motion"). 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA 
[14] In exchange for Hawley entering a 
plea of guilty to Count I of the Indictment, 
the government also agreed, inter alia, not 
to oppose that Hawley receive a three level 
reduction for acceptance of responsibility and 
not to oppose that Hawley not receive a two 
level enhancement for obstruction of justice. 
The presentence report recommended that 
Hawley should receive a two-level enhance-
ment for obstruction of justice and that, pur-
suant to Application Note 4 of U.S.S.G. 
§ 3E1.1, Hawley be denied a downward ad-
justment for acceptance of responsibility. In 
the government's written response to the 
presentence report, the government made 
the following comments: 
The government responds in acknowl-
edging its obligation under the plea agree-
ment not to advocate such an enhancement 
but agrees with the facts related to the 
presentence report. 
The government acknowledges its obli-
gation under the plea agreement to not 
oppose a three-level reduction for accep-
tance of responsibility. Further, the gov-
ernment agrees with the facts related in 
the presentence report and states there is 
no evidence that this is "an extraordinary 
case" allowing for both an enhancement 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 and a reduc-
tion pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. 
At the sentencing hearing the government 
made the following additional comments to 
the judge: 
May it please the court, your honor, re-
garding the defendant's objections, we 
have filed a formal response to the formal 
objections. They are considered in the 
presentence investigation report. They 
accurately reflect the government's posi-
tion. Pursuant to plea agreement, our po-
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sition was that, at the time that the agree-
ment was signed, to not oppose that no 
enhancement for obstruction occur, and 
not oppose that exception—acceptance of 
responsibility credit be given; however, we 
note for the record the facts contained in 
the presentence investigation report that 
we were not aware of at the time of the 
agreement. We also note the facts regard-
ing the defendant's debriefing that—or 
lack thereof that were unknown to us at 
the time that we entered into the plea 
agreement. We believe that in spite of our 
absence of opposition to the defendant's 
not getting the obstruction and getting 
acceptance that the facts are accurately 
recited in the PSIR. 
As it relates to this, however, being an 
extraordinary circumstance meriting any 
extraordinary credit, we believe the record 
is completely devoid of that and that the 
record would be in the PSIR, and we 
believe that the court, upon reflection of 
the facts contained therein, should come to 
a similar conclusion. There is just nothing 
extraordinary about this matter as it re-
lates to the role in the offense, the defen-
dant's role in the offense between him and 
Mr. Guardado. He would have been above 
Mr. Guardado, and in fact, it appears that 
through his relationship with his brother 
would have had a substantially superior 
role to others involved in this matter as a 
purely factual matter, and for that reason, 
largely for that reason, he was unwilling to 
give up any information whatsoever in a 
timely fashion regarding his brother, in a 
fashion where anything regarding the alle-
gations in this indictment could have been 
reasonably linked to his brother, so for 
those reasons, we would ask the court to 
consider the plea agreement and to consid-
er the facts contained in the PSIR that 
were considered in responding to the de-
fendant's objections in light of those facts 
that were unknown to the government at 
the time that the plea agreement was en-
tered. Thank you. 
Immediately following the government's 
commerts during the sentencing hearing, 
Hawley made the following motion: 
Your Honor, the government, by the com-
ments that it has just made, has com-
pletely violated every term of the plej 
agreement that was entered into herein 
therefore we move to withdraw the plea 
The district court denied the motion. 
"[W]hen a plea rests in any significan 
degree on a promise or agreement of th< 
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be pan 
of the inducement or consideration, sue] 
promise must be fulfilled." Santobello ,u 
Neiv York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct 495 
499, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). Furthermore 
"[i]n order to comply with the plea agree: 
ment, the government cannot rely upon;! 
Vigidly literal construction of the language 
of the agreement, nor may it accomplisl 
'through indirect means what it promised noi 
to do directly.'" United States v. Hand, 912 
F.2d 854, 856 (10th Cir.1990) (quoting Unitel 
States v. ShorteetK 887 F.2d 253, 256 (lOtl 
Cir.1989)). We review de novo whether gov 
ernment conduct has violated a plea agree 
ment. Allen u. Hodden, 57 F.3d 1529, 15$ 
(10th Cir.), cert, denied, — U.S. , 111 
S.Ct. 544,133 L.Ed.2d 447 (1995). 
Plea agreements are governed by contracl 
principles, Massey, 997 F.2d at 824, and.we 
must construe the Plea Agreement according 
to what Hawley "reasonably understood) 
when he entered his plea, Shorteeth, 887 R2c 
at 256. After review of the Plea Agreemenl 
in this case, and the governments statement 
to the court during sentencing, we conclude 
that the Agreement can reasonably be ihtiea 
preted as proscribing the comments made-l>3 
the government at the sentencing hearing 
Furthermore, we conclude that the conl 
ments accomplished by indirect means whaj 
the government promised not to do directijj 
The government argues that it was only fal 
filling its obligation to apprise the courteaj 
"information which protects the sentencinj 
decision from the taint of incomplete; anc 
inaccurate information." The governmeH 
further contends that provision of such infjWj 
mation does not violate a plea agreemeg 
where the prosecutor does not a t t empt^ 
characterize or argue its effect to the sea 
tenting judge. 
However, here the government was*iEJ 
responding to "inaccurate information."*^^ 
Hand, 913 F.2d at 856 (indicating thatitifi 
U.S. v. HAWLEY 
Cite as 93 F.3d 682 (10th Cir. 1996) 693 
prosecutor has a responsibility to inform the 
court so that its decision will not be "tainted 
by incomplete and inaccurate information"). 
To the contrary, the government merely un-
(jerscored the facts recited in the PSIR and 
argued that such facts did not show that 
Hawley had presented an extraordinary situ-
ation that would entitle him to a reduction in 
his sentence given the finding that he had 
obstructed justice. Taken as a whole, the 
prosecutor's comments here appear to be a 
thinly disguised, if disguised at all, effort to 
persuade the court in a way that the govern-
ment had promised it would not do. In 
Hand, the government agreed in a plea 
agreement to recommend a two-level reduc-
tion for the defendant's role as a minor par-
ticipant in the offense. 913 F.2d at 855. At 
the defendant's sentencing hearing, the de-
fendant personally testified concerning his 
role in the offense and called witness to 
support his position. Id. The government 
cross-examined these witnesses, and in doing 
so elicited certain factual clarifications which 
tended to undermine the defendant's position 
that he played a minor role in the offense. 
Id. The government ultimately did recom-
mend that the defendant receive a reduction 
for having a minor role in the offense, stating 
to the court that "the court's well aware of 
the facts in this case and can make its own 
conclusion." Id. at S56. The defendant ar-
gued that the government violated the plea 
agreement by eliciting unfavorable facts on 
cross examination during the sentencing 
hearing and by the prosecutor's comments 
that the court was free to reach its own 
conclusion based on the facts before it. Id. 
We rejected defendant's claim, holding that 
la] promise to 'recommend a reduction' is 
not a promise to stand mute in the face of 
incorrect or misleading testimony offered be-
fore the trial court." Id. We did, however, 
a&ggest that if the prosecutor had attempted 
to "characterize the evidence elicited on cross 
examination," or to "argue the effect of such 
evidence to the sentencing judge," the result 
anght have been different. Id. & n. 3. 
Here, the government's comments do 
characterize the facts and do argue a conclu-
^ a to the sentencing judge. The govern-
ment's negative comments with regard to 
Aether this case was "extraordinary" could 
only have the effect of opposing Hawley's 
receipt of an adjustment for acceptance of 
responsibility. As discussed earlier, the 
only way Hawley could have received a re-
duction for acceptance of responsibility after 
having received an enhancement for obstruc-
tion of justice would have been if he quali-
fied as an "extraordinary" case. U.S.S.G. 
§ 3E1.1, Application Note 4. Furthermore, 
the government was not correcting inaccu-
rate information when it asserted that the 
record is udevoid" of facts indicating that 
this is an extraordinary case, and stating 
that i4we believe that the court, upon reflec-
tion of the facts contained therein, should 
come to a similar conclusion." These state-
ments do more than merely state facts or 
simply validate those facts found in the Pre-
sentence Report; they provide a legal "char-
acterization" of those facts and "argue the 
effect" of those facts to the sentencing 
judge. 
[15] Finally, the fact that the government 
may not have been aware of certain facts in 
the Presentence Report at the time it en-
tered into the Agreement with Hawley does 
not excuse or justify its conduct at the sen-
tencing hearing. When plea agreements are 
made with "full knowledge of the facts at 
hand," those agreements must be adhered to 
by the prosecution in order to maintain the 
integrity of the plea. United States v. Coo-
per, 70 F.3d 563, 567 (10th Cir.1995) (empha-
sis added). 
If at a later date the government discovers 
facts that cause it to believe that its prose-
cutorial discretion was not properly exer-
cised, it has the ethical obligation to with-
draw from the plea agreement and advise 
the defendant so that he or she may pre-
pare for trial or renegotiate. It is certain-
ly not proper for the government to wait 
until the sentencing hearing then breach 
the terms of the plea agreement, shielding 
its behavior by claiming its obligation to be 
an ethical officer of the court. 
Id. The government breached its plea 
agreement with Hawley, and Hawley is enti-
tled to relief regardless of whether the gov-
ernment's conduct actually affected the sen-
tencing judge. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-
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63, 92 S.Ct. at 498-99 (holding that whether 
or not the prosecutor's conduct actually influ-
enced the judge's decision or not, "the inter-
ests of justice and appropriate recognition of 
the duties of the prosecution in relation to 
promises made in the negotiation of pleas of 
guilty will be best served by remanding the 
case to the state courts for further consider-
ation"). 
[16] The Court in Sa?itobello remanded 
the case back to the state courts to deter-
mine the defendant's ultimate relief because 
the state court was "in a better position to 
decide whether the circumstances of [the] 
case require only that there be specific per-
formance of the agreement on the plea, in 
which case [defendant] should be resen-
tenced by a different judge, or whether, in 
the view of the state court, the circumstances 
require granting the relief sought by [defen-
dant], i.e., the opportunity to withdraw his 
plea of guilty." Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263, 
92 S.Ct. at 499 (footnote omitted). Providing 
this type of latitude for the district court on 
remand is preferable in light of the district 
court's position with respect to the case. See 
Allen, 57 F.3d at 1534 (citing Santobello and 
stating that "[i]f the court finds that the 
government breached the plea agreement, 
the court must remand the case either for 
specific performance or withdrawal of the 
defendant's guilty plea"). Compare Cooper, 
70 F.3d at 567 (when it is clear from the 
appellate record that the government's 
breach of the plea agreement is intentional 
or egregious, the appellate court may con-
clude that resentencing is not an adequate 
remedy and it may order that defendant be 
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea). Here, 
we believe it is appropriate to remand this 
matter to the district court for its determina-
tion of whether the defendant should be per-
mitted to withdraw his guilty plea or whether 
he should simply be resentenced by another 
judge under conditions where the govern-
ment fulfills the promises it made in the Plea 
Agreement to not oppose that Hawley re-
ceive a three level reduction for acceptance 
of responsibility and to not oppose that Haw-
ley not receive a two level enhancement for 
obstruction of justice. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, we AFw 
FIRM the district court's rulings in this'case 
in all respects, with the exception of it$ 
denial of Hawle/s Motion to Withdraw: 
Guilty Plea. We REMAND with mstruc* 
tions that the district court determine v L - ^ 
er Hawle/s plea should be vacated, allowing; 
him to replead, or whether Hawley should be; 
resentenced by a different judge. IV> 
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UNITED STATES of America, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Johnny Joe LOPEZ, Defendant-
Appellant 
No. 95-1193. 
United States Court of Appeals,' 
Tenth Circuit 
Aug. 19, 1996. 
After settlement of civil in rem forfej 
ture proceeding against items that were$aj| 
legedly used in, or were proceeds of, defen 
dant's drug activities, defendant movectfti 
dismiss indictment charging him witfeiri 
state travel in aid of racketeering enterpri 
on ground that prosecution pursuant tottl 
indictment would violate double jeop 
The United States District Court forr t 
District of Colorado, Richard P. Matsch$ffl 
denied motion. Defendant appealed;^9 
Court of Appeals, McWilliams, Senior ( 
Judge, held that civil in rem forfeiture J
 < 
was not "punishment" for double jeopardy 
purposes. 
Affirmed. 
1. Double Jeopardy <3=>1 
Double jeopardy clause protects «j 
second prosecution for same offense^ 
U.S. v. 
Cite as 93 F.3d 6 
prior acquittal, against second prosecution 
for same offense after prior conviction, and 
against multiple punishments for same of-
fense. U.S.C A Const.Amend. 5. 
2. Double Jeopardy <3=25 
Civil in rem forfeiture of items that were 
used in, or were proceeds of, defendant's 
drug activities was not "punishment" for dou-
ble jeopardy purposes, and thus, did not 
preclude subsequent prosecution for inter-
state travel in aid of racketeering enterprise. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 5; 18 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 981, 1952(a)(1); Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 
§ 511, 21 U.S.C.A. § 881. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
Submitted on the briefs: * 
, Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, 
and Susan L. Foreman, Assistant Federal 
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for De-
fendant-Appellant. 
Henry L. Solano, United States Attorney, 
and John M. Hutchins, Assistant United 
States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Plain-
tiff-Appellee. 
Before TACHA, Circuit Judge, 
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge, and 
McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 
McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 
This case involves the jeopardy clause of 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
. On September 29, 1992, a federal parole 
iolation arrest warrant was issued for John-
iy Joe Lopez, the appellant It was execut-
ed on January 13, 1993, at Lopez' apartment 
n
 Westminster, Colorado. An ensuing 
fcarch of his apartment revealed eight kilo-
grams of cocaine, twenty kilograms of mari-
• "* «er brief counsel for Lopez requested oral 
- argument. The government in its answer brief 
, waived oral argument. The case was later set 
; for oral argument on May 15, 1996. On April 
% «". 1996, counsel for Lopez filed a motion to 
• .submit the case on the briefs. This motion was 
^granted on April 24, 1996. and on May 16. 1996. 
-OPEZ 695 
(10th Cir. 1996) 
juana, approximately $100,000 in United 
States currency, and a warranty deed con-
veying title to a residence located at 10736 
Livingston Drive, Northglenn, Colorado, to 
Lopez. 
The United States then filed a civil in rem 
forfeiture action pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881 
and 18 U.S.C. § 981. The complaint sought 
forfeiture of the currency found in Lopez' 
apartment, his interest in the property locat-
ed at 10736 Livingston Drive in Northglenn, 
his automobile, and some additional items of 
personal property. The government alleged 
that the items sought to be forfeited were 
used in, or were proceeds of, Lopez* drug 
activities. A settlement was reached in this 
proceeding whereby Lopez agreed to forfeit 
the currency found in his apartment, a car, 
jewelry, the residence on Livingston Drive, 
and various items of personal property. A 
final order and judgment of forfeiture was 
entered on September 23, 1993. 
On September 22, 1994, the United States 
filed a two-count indictment against Lopez, 
charging him with the unlawful possession of 
cocaine and marijuana with an intent to dis-
tribute each, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The indict-
ment was based on the eight kilograms of 
cocaine and the twenty kilograms of marijua-
na found in Lopez' apartment on January 13, 
1993. 
The parties thereafter entered into a plea 
bargain whereby Lopez agreed to plead 
guilty to a one-count information charging 
him with interstate travel in aid of a racke-
teering enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1952(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Lopez fur-
ther agreed to provide testimony before the 
grand jury regarding the source of the 
drugs. The government, in turn, agreed to 
dismiss the original indictment.1 On Novem-
ber 29, 1994, Lopez pleaded guilty to the one-
count information. 
the case was submitted to this panel without oral 
argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 
34.1.9. 
1. The plea bargain contained a stipulation that 
during January, 1993, Lopez traveled from Colo-
rado to Texas to make payment for the delivery 
of eight kilograms of cocaine to Colorado. 
